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ABSTRACT
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO SIGNIFICANT FACTORS OF MORAL 
REASONING AND THEIR INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL JUDGMENT AND
INTENTIONS
by
JANET K. MULLIN MARTA. B.A. (English), Florida State University, 1977; M.T.S. 
(Theological Studies), Virginia Theological Seminary, 1996.
Dissertation directed by Dr. Anusom Singhapakdi.
This dissertation is a partial test o f  the Hunt-Vitell (1986, 1993) general theory of 
marketing ethics, which, along with previous tests of the model and other empirical and 
theoretical work, serves as the basis for this research. The dissertation model is the most 
comprehensive test o f Hunt-Vitell to date, in the sense that it tests variables at almost 
every stage o f the ethical decision making process described in the Hunt-Vitell theory.
The sample was obtained through a mail survey of American Marketing 
Association (AMA) practitioner members. Empirical testing was carried out through 
correlation and regression analysis. O f the seventeen hypotheses, nine were supported 
and three had weak support. The findings confirm the hypothesis that marketers who 
work in firms with higher corporate ethical values are more perceptive o f situations with 
problematic ethical content. Personal religiousness is also positively related to such 
perception; relativism, as a personal moral philosophy, is negatively related, both as 
hypothesized. Though these characteristics are exogenous in the model, and somewhat 
distant from actual ethical behavior, the findings are important because perception of an 
ethical problem actually triggers the entire process of ethical decision making.
iii
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Also well supported in this research is the hypothesized predominance o f the 
deontological (duty-based) evaluation over the teleological one (consequential). 
Marketers who tend toward deontological reasoning make more ethical judgments, and 
that judgment was found to be positively related to ethical intentions. A weak link was 
found between personal relativism and teleological evaluation, as hypothesized.
Insignificant results include the fact that no support was found for a link between 
a teleological evaluation and ethical judgment, or for a negative relationship between 
personal religiousness and teleological reasoning. There was also no relationship between 
higher corporate ethical values and either deontological or teleological evaluation.
Finally, the data do not support a negative relationship between personal relativism and 
teleological evaluations.
iv
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Chapter I 
Introduction
The subject of business ethics is o f  burgeoning interest in the business literature. 
In the 1996 edition of his classic marketing textbook, Philip Kotler lists seven trends in 
marketing that necessitated his current revision; one of them is the growing interest in 
ethics. In a recent survey of 54 firms, where respondents rated a number o f important 
factors in doing business (“Ethics Still Matter,” The Virginian-Pilot, 11/20/93), 53 gave 
“integrity/ethics” a top rating o f  4 and one firm gave it a 3. Though one scholar wrote that 
studying ethics was like trying to “nail jello to the wall” (Lewis 1985), much work has 
been done in recent years, drawing from such fields as moral philosophy, social 
psychology, theology, sociology and public administration. The very volume of research, 
along with the establishment o f three scholarly journals1 devoted exclusively to the 
subject o f business ethics, testifies to the perceived importance o f the topic.
Importance of Ethics Research
Fundamental to an understanding o f business ethics is an underlying debate, at 
both the philosophical and the practical level, about whether business actually has an 
ethical dimension. At the philosophical level is the question as to whether a firm can be a 
“moral agent” (i.e., the person that makes a moral decision, whether he or she is aware of 
the moral nature of the dilemma or not [Jones 1991]). Can a huge global conglomerate 
that exists only as a legal entity be held responsible for moral agency? Although the
1 The Journal o f  Business Ethics, the Business and Professional Ethics Journal, and Business Ethics Quarterly.
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question is debated vociferously among the more philosophically minded ethicists, it is to 
some extent disingenuous. After all, as De George (1990, p. 9) explains, “business 
activity is human activity, [and thus] it car* be evaluated from the moral point o f view” 
and “Many more people now expect companies to act morally, at least in certain instances 
and within certain limits. It is no longer true that anything goes” (De George 1990, p. 4).
If this is indeed true, business people need to assess the morality of certain actions 
before those are revealed on the front page of The New York Times. This may, at first 
glance, seem a small requirement; after all, individuals make moral decisions almost on a 
daily basis.2 But there are major differences between individuals and corporations:
Business is not structured to handle questions of values and morality, and 
its managers have usually not been trained in business schools to do so.
Experience has supplied even less training along these lines. Hence, many 
businesses have faced a new dilemma. They are now beginning to feel they 
should respond to demands involving social values, and should take moral 
issues into account in their deliberations, but do not know how to do so.
(De George 1990, p. 5).
Scholarly research in business ethics, therefore, is an attempt to address these 
needs. The work has proceeded apace in the field of marketing, partly because marketers 
are on the “front lines.” As Laczniak and Murphy (1991) write, “When a marketing 
decision is ethically troublesome, its highly visible outcomes can be a public 
embarrassment or sometimes worse” (Laczniak and Murphy 1991, p. 259). They go on to 
cite a number of ethical violations from newspaper reports and several polls showing that
2 Should I cheat on my income tax? Is it right to tell a telephone solicitor that my husband is not at home, when he is in 
the living room reading the newspaper? Is it really wrong to make copies o f  my Christmas letter on the Xerox 
machine at the office?
2
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Americans distrust the morality of business. And among business people, marketers are 
perceived as the least trustworthy:
In a 1983 Gallup study judging the ethicalness of various occupations, the 
categories salespeople and advertising practitioners were ranked at the 
bottom o f the honesty and ethical standards scale (Laczniak and Murphy 
1991, p. 261).
Clearly, marketers need help with ethical decision making, so researchers are addressing a 
felt need in the business community when they reach for the toolbox3 of the scientific 
method to the study of marketing ethics. To recap, then, this research assumes that 
business has a moral dimension, which results in ethical dilemmas for individual 
businesspeople. Marketers, particularly, are often in the public eye and need to be careful 
about the morality of their actions, but trustworthy guidance in such evaluations is hard to 
find. This research addresses that need, by attempting to bring further clarity to the 
process by which marketers make ethical decisions, in the hope that such understanding 
will be a step toward helping marketers act morally; so that reports of their behavior in 
The New York Times would ennoble the entire profession.
The Models
There is, however, a wide gulf between the conclusion that business ethics 
requires scientific study and the determination of how to carry out such work. According 
to Jones (1991, p. 366), “despite this increased attention to ethics in organizations, 
theoretical and empirical examinations of ethical decision making in organizations are in
3 The description o f the scientific method as a toolbox is from Hunt’s (1991) full explication o f  marketing research as 
science.
3
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relatively short supply.” He goes on to list several models (Trevino 1986, Ferrell and 
Gresham 1985, Hunt and Vitell 1986, and Dubinsky and Loken 1989) and to add his own. 
These are all positive models, in that they theorize a process o f moral decision making as 
it actually occurs. He neglects to mention some normative work, especially that by Robin 
and Reidenbach (1987, 1988, 1990, 1993), whose main focus has been to describe how a 
focus on ethics should be incorporated into strategic planning in marketing. It would be 
misleading to conclude, however, that the firm’s ethical climate is the sole determinant o f  
ethical decision making; that the individual decision maker is an empty vessel, to be filled 
up with “ethical core values.”
Still, while this work serves as a reminder of the important social component of 
ethical decision making, and that positive work without normative implications can be 
“barren”4, it is the positive models that function to guide empirical research. Hunt and 
Vitell (1986, 1993), particularly, took care to develop a model that is “descriptive, rather 
than prescriptive” (Hunt and Vitell 1986, p. 758). They called their model a “theory”, 
based on Hunt’s summary o f  “the three key criteria of theory— (1) systematically related, 
(2) lawlike generalizations, and (3) empirically testable” (Hunt 1991, p. 149). Thus, their 
model specifies systematic relationships between constructs, which can be tested 
empirically. The lawlike generalizations in the model include the presence of individual 
and social components, preexistent individual characteristics that influence ethical 
judgement, and the influence of two moral philosophies, deontology and teleology.
4 Robin’s word, in a criticism o f Hunt’s Three Dichotomies model (Hunt 1991. p. 31).
4
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Components From M oral Philosophy
According to Robin and Reidenbach (1987), deontology and teleology5 “dominate 
current thinking in moral philosophy” (Robin and Reidenbach 1987, p. 46). Murphy and 
Laczniak (1981) claimed that almost all ethical theories could be classified as one or the 
other. Although there are variations of deontology and teleology in which the differences 
between them are slight, in general they are quite distinct. Deontology focuses on the act 
itself, while teleology assesses outcomes. As Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 6) write, 
“deontological theories focus on the specific actions or behaviors of an individual, 
whereas teleological theories focus on the consequences of the actions or behaviors.” De 
George (1990) describes the differences exhaustively, allowing each theory an entire 
chapter in his textbook on business ethics.
Though the presence of deontological and teleological components in ethical 
decision making has such broad theoretical support as to deserve the appellation lawlike 
generalization, it remains unclear how people apply these philosophies in specific 
situations. This is one question of interest in the present dissertation research: do 
marketers generally use both types of reasoning, and if so, do they receive equal weight in 
most decisions? In addition, this study investigates the influences of an individual’s 
religiousness and relativism on moral decision making; also, how a corporation’s ethical 
values affect such decisions.
5 Robin and Reidenbach use utilitarianism instead o f teleology. Some authors use utilitarianism as the broader category 
(e.g., Robin and Reidenbach, De George), while others believe that teleology encompasses utilitarianism (e.g.. Hunt 
and Vitell, Schwartz). This author makes no effort to settle the question, merely following the Hunt and Vitell usage.
5
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Contributions and Topical Overview
This dissertation work, then, is an empirical test of the Hunt and Vitell (1986, 
1993) model of ethical decision making in marketing; results should make two 
contributions to the discipline. First, the scale to measure religiousness is new, having 
been developed specifically for use in marketing, and it is highly reliable. A good 
measure o f religiousness is essential in ethics research, but such a scale could also be 
helpful in other areas o f marketing (e.g., Wilkes, Burnett and Howell [1986] studied the 
effect o f religiousness in consumer research). Second, the work offers a new way to 
measure the relative influences o f deontological and teleological evaluations in a 
marketer’s ethical decision making process. This tests the core o f the Hunt-Vitell model 
and should also represent a contribution to ethics theory generally. Third, the research 
assesses the effects of an individual’s relativism and the corporation’s ethical values on 
moral decision making.
The dissertation contains five chapters. This introductory chapter presents the 
purpose of the research, in the context of marketing ethics theories. The next chapter 
contains a review of the literature, starting with the major theoretical models and then 
becoming more focused on the model and constructs to be tested. The focus here is on the 
empirical work that has already contributed to our understanding of the constructs in the 
dissertation model. Chapter three is a description of the methodology and procedures 
involved in the research, and the results o f the experiment make up the fourth chapter. 
Finally, chapter five is a discussion of the results and their implications, with a full 
analysis of the limitations inherent in the methodology.
6
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Chapter II 
Literature Review
Theory development in marketing ethics has proceeded apace in the 1980s and 
1990s. Scholars have published a number o f theoretical models (e.g., Ferrell and Gresham 
1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986, 1993), numerous testable propositions (e.g., Hunt and Vitell 
1986; Vitell et al. 1993) and hundreds of conceptual articles and empirical studies. This 
dissertation research is grounded on one o f the models, but incorporates elements from 
four of them, so this chapter reviews three models broadly and the fourth in further depth. 
Next, the chapter contains a short discussion on the question of whether the models 
constitute some stage o f theory development or are really simply research frameworks. 
The review will then concentrate on the variables in the dissertation model.
Marketing Ethics Frameworks
In a relatively early study of ethical decision making in organizations, Laczniak 
and Interrieden (1987, p. 304) concluded that “in the long run, organizations must not 
only be concerned with what policies stimulate improved behavior but also why some 
managers take unethical actions while others do not. This implies a need to understand 
the cognitive value structure o f an organization’s employees.” Models of the process of 
ethical decision making in marketing situations are an attempt to address this need, and, 
as such, must represent a number o f individual and environmental variables, including 
constructs derived from moral philosophy, psychology, and other behavioral sciences. 
Moral philosophy informs these models primarily through analysis of deontological and
7
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teleological moral reasoning; that is, how an individual makes a moral decision after 
becoming aware o f the existence of an ethical dilemma. This chapter contains a detailed 
discussion o f these elements of moral philosophy in the section dealing with 
deontological and teleological evaluations. Psychological research influences the models 
primarily through Kohlberg’s work on cognitive moral development (CMD) and Rest’s 
further work on modeling and testing the theory, both o f which are described in the 
sections on Trevino’s and Jones’ models. This dissertation research is grounded explicitly 
on the Hunt-Vitell (HV) model, which some (e.g., Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990) consider 
to be the most complete of the positive models. It incorporates moral philosophy and 
psychology at various important points of a six-stage process o f ethical decision making. 
Hunt-Vitell, therefore, receives fuller explication than the other models, through a 
literature review of results of empirical tests of the theory.
Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich— Contingency and Synthesis
Ferrell and Gresham’s 1985 model (see Figure 2-1) represents the first important 
effort o f its kind within the marketing ethics research stream. It is based explicitly on 
moral philosophy, but fails to incorporate knowledge from psychological research on 
moral development. The focus is on the contingent factors that affect the individual 
decision maker, individual (knowledge, values, attitudes, and intentions) and 
organizational (significant others and opportunity). A feedback loop describes the effect 
of experience on future ethical behavior.
8
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Figure 2-1. A Contingency Model o f  Ethical Decision Making in a Marketing Organization (Ferrell and 
Gresham 1985, p. 89)
A further contribution in 1989 was Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich’s attempt to 
bring together the original model, Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory 
(described in further detail in the section on the Trevino model), and the Hunt-Vitell 
model (see Figure 2-2). They represent a person’s stage o f cognitive moral development 
as a cognition, while HV terms it a personal characteristic. This model also makes the 
influence of moral philosophy explicit.


















Figure 2-2. Synthesis Integrated Model o f Ethical Decision Making in Business (Ferrell. Gresham and 
Fraedrich 1989, p. 60)
Trevino— Person-Situation Interactionist
Trevino (1986) modeled ethical decision making as an intersection between an 
individual and a situation, informed by the stage of cognitive moral development and 
resulting in ethical or unethical behavior (see Figure 2-3). There is nothing here of the 
decision making process, but it performed the important function o f bringing Kohlberg’s 
work, which Trevino considers “the most popular and tested theory o f moral reasoning” 
(Trevino 1992, p. 445), into the business ethics models.
10
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Figure 2-3. A Person-Situation Interactionisl Model (Trevino 1986, p. 614)
Kohlberg identified three levels of moral development (see Figure 2-4), each of 
which has two stages, and he and his colleagues found that people progress through the 
stages in a given order, in a “clear pattern of development” (Elm and Weber 1994, 
p. 342). Movement to the next stage occurs because a cognitive dissonance begins to 
occur; a person begins to perceive the contradiction between his or her current level of 
moral reasoning and the next higher one. Education and age are important determinants
li
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o f these levels, as people are introduced to higher level ideas that seem attractive, though 
Kohlberg’s research indicates that few individuals reach stage six.
Level 1: Preconventional 
Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation 
Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation
Level 2: Conventional 
Stage 3: “Good Boy/Nice Girl” Orientation 
Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation
Level 3: Postconventional 
Stage 5: Social— Contract Legalistic Orientation 
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation
Figure 2-4. Kohlberg's stages o f moral development (Elm and Weber 1994, p. 342)
Trevino’s model is the least consequential, of the four, for this research. It 
incorporates no component from moral philosophy and takes a more macro perspective 
on the cognitive process o f ethical decision making.
Jones— Issue-Contingent
This most recent o f the models is Jones’ attempt to correct what he perceives as a 
major flaw in the previous theoretical work: none of the models “does more than hint that 
characteristics o f the moral issue itself will affect the moral decision making process” 
(Jones 1991, p. 369). The model he proposes (see Figure 2-5) is based on James Rest’s 
(1986) four-component model of the ethical decision making process, moderated by 
organizational factors and the moral intensity inherent in the particular issue. Rest asked
12
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what psychological processes a person goes through to produce moral behavior. He 
concluded that there are four psychological processes to be accomplished: ‘'(1) interpret 
the situation in terms of the actions possible, and the effects o f these actions on the self 
and others; (2) judge which course o f action is morally right; (3) give priority to what is 
morally right over other considerations; (4) demonstrate the strength and skills to follow 
through on the intention to behave morally” (Trevino 1992, p. 445).
The contribution of Jones’ model, however, is not its focus on the moral issue, 
which is represented as the triggering mechanism in all four of the other models. The 
moral issue is present explicitly, as ethical issue or ethical dilemma, in Ferrell and 
Gresham (1985), Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich (1989), and Trevino (1986), and 
implicitly, as perceived ethical problem , in Hunt and Vitell (1986, 1993). Probably Jones’ 
most important addition, in terms of further research, was the construct moral intensity, 
which the model postulates as a way to represent any ethical issue. Moral intensity has six 
components:
• Magnitude of consequences—the total harm or benefit that results from the action in 
question.
• Social consensus—the degree of agreement within society about the relative goodness 
or evil or an act.
• Probability of effect—the determination of how likely it is both that the action will 
take place and that particular results will follow.
• Temporal immediacy—the period o f time between the action and its consequences.
• Proximity—the social feeling o f closeness that the moral actor has for those who will 
be affected by his or her action.
• Concentration of effect—the relative seriousness of the consequences of the action. 
Defrauding an elderly person, living on a fixed income, of $1,000 may be considered 
to have a more concentrated effect than defrauding a large insurance conglomerate of 
$100,000, for example.
13
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Figure 2-5. An Issue-Contingent Model o f Ethical Decision Making in Organizations (Jones 1991, p. 391)
Although Jones’ article included a number o f propositions, it remained for other 
scholars to develop ways to measure his constructs and assess the relationships among 
them (e.g., Morris and McDonald 1995, Robin et al. 1996, Singhapakdi et al. 1996). A 
notable feature of the model is the lack of a feedback loop following moral behavior.
14
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Hunt-Vitell—General Theory o f  Marketing Ethics
In contrast to much of the earlier work in marketing ethics, Hunt and Vitell 
intended their model (1986, 1993) to be positive and descriptive. As such, it depicts 
ethical decision making as a process consisting of six stages and a feedback loop. The 
original version of the theory, published in 1986, contained the same relationships as the 
1993 model, but far less detail o f proposed environmental and personal influences. Figure 
2-6 shows the model, as revised in 1993. Because this dissertation research is grounded 
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Figure 2-6. Hunt-Vitell General Theory o f  Marketing Ethics (Hunt and Vitell 1993, p. 776)
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first stage represents an attempt to describe the societal/environmental effects 
that were exogenous in Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich 
(1989). Cultural, professional, industry and organizational environments combine with 
personal characteristics to influence perception of the existence of an ethical problem, 
alternatives, and consequences. Personal characteristics are also affected through a 
feedback loop, which implies that people evaluate previous moral choices and their 
consequences and that evaluation influences future ethical decisions.
For Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989), Rest (1986), and Jones (1991), as 
well as Hunt and Vitell (1993), perception is the first step in the actual process of ethical 
decision making. Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 761) write that “perception of an ethical 
problem situation triggers the whole process depicted by the model. If the individual does 
not perceive some ethical content in a problem situation, subsequent elements of the 
model do not come into play. Therefore, it is extremely important that any situations or 
scenarios used to test the model empirically be perceived by respondents as having ethical 
content.”
In the next stage, the individual assembles norms and consequences for further 
analysis. Norms can include those as general as the Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you.”) and others that are situation-specific (e.g., client 
confidentiality). Consequential information that one gathers includes the probability and 
desirability of consequences and the importance of stakeholders. These gather together 
much of Jones’ moral intensity construct: probabilities o f consequences (HV) equates to 
probability of effect (Jones); desirability of consequences (HV) could capture magnitude
16
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of consequences, social consensus, temporal immediacy and concentration o f effect 
(Jones); and importance of stakeholders (HV) might in many cases be proximity (Jones). 
The important distinction is that HV separates the information that one gathers at this 
point into categories from moral philosophy; everything to be weighed in the decision is 
either a norm or a potential consequence.
After the information has been gathered, the individual arrives at what Hunt and 
Vitell term “the heart of the model” (1986, p. 763), using deontological and teleological 
evaluations to arrive at an ethical judgment. There may be occasions when a person does 
not consider consequences, but relies solely on deontological norms when making a 
decision, as there may be times when consequences are the sole determinant, but Hunt 
and Vitell postulate that in most circumstances individuals use both types o f evaluation. 
Ethical judgment then affects behavior through the intervention of intention (consistent 
with consumer behavior theories and the Fishbein and Ajzen [1975] model), though 
behavior is then further influenced by the construct action control, meaning “the extent to 
which an individual actually exerts control in the enactment of an intention in a particular 
situation” (Hunt and Vitell 1993, p. 780).
Hunt and Vitell’s general theory included seven testable propositions to guide 
researchers in empirical tests of the model, while also recommending that scholars could, 
and should, infer many more testable relationships. For example, their second proposition 
states that the intention to behave in a given manner is a function of ethical judgment and 
a teleological evaluation. Their fifth proposition states that the deontological evaluation is 
a function of the deontological norms that the moral actor applies to each alternative.
17
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Two propositions on Hunt and Vitell’s list will be tested explicitly in this dissertation 
research:
EJ = f(DE, TE)
I = f(EJ, TE)
That is, ethical judgment is a function of deontological and teleological evaluations and 
intentions are a function o f  ethical judgment and a teleological evaluation.
A number o f the other propositions have been tested since the publication of the 
theory in 1986. For example, Vitell (1986) and Vitell and Hunt (1990) found that sales 
and marketing managers relied on both deontological and teleological evaluations when 
making ethical judgments, and that they formed intentions based on ethical judgments 
and teleological considerations. Akaah (1997) and Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993) 
tested the relative importance o f deontological norms and teleological evaluations. Their 
results showed that marketers relied more on deontological norms than on teleological 
evaluations when forming ethical judgments. Mayo and Marks (1990) confirmed the 
relationships specified in the HV model, but their empirical results showed teleological 
evaluations weighing more heavily than deontological norms when marketers form 
ethical judgments and intentions. Their operationalizations, however, were rightly 
questioned (Hunt 1990). Singhapakdi and Vitell (1990, 1991) investigated the 
relationships between a number of background factors and perceived ethical problem, 
perceived alternatives, and deontological norms. They found that marketers who scored 
high on the Machiavellianism scale were less likely to perceive ethical problems to be 
serious, while those working in organizations that enforced codes o f ethics showed the
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
opposite. High Machiavellianism was also negatively related to perceived alternatives. 
Although they claim that their operationalization o f deontological norms (based on the 
AMA Code o f Ethics) could pose a limitation, they confirmed a negative relationship 
between Machiavellianism and deontological norms and between locus of control and 
deontological norms. Goolsby and Hunt (1992) and Sparks and Hunt (1998) 
conceptualized and tested two background factors from the model: cognitive moral 
development and ethical sensitivity (respectively). Singhapakdi and Vitell (1993) found 
that marketers’ ethical judgments could be partially explained by personal and 
professional values.
Function o f  the Models in Empirical Research
These studies, and others, have confirmed a number of relationships in the HV 
model and contributed considerably toward operationalizing constructs in the model. 
There have been no serious challenges to the structure of the model as a description of the 
process o f ethical decision making, though some scholars question its function (e.g.,
Jones 1991), and that of the other models (e.g., Brady and Hatch 1992). The major 
objections are that (1) models are static, (2) any particular model receives insufficient 
testing, and (3) positive models are barren of scientific purpose. Brady and Hatch (1992) 
write that models confuse theory with empiricism; the authors present their models in the 
status o f theory, but they are really products o f research traditions. They solve no 
problems, raise only general issues, and are confusing in terms of their causal links. 
Reidenbach and Robin (1987, 1988) object that limiting moral philosophies to deontology 
and teleology both assumes a high level of moral development and restricts the use of
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hybrid philosophies. In a critique of Shelby Hunt’s Three Dichotomies Model (Hunt 
1991, pp. 10-11), Robin wrote that “positive issues are barren except where they have 
prescriptive implications” (Hunt 1991, p. 31).
Still, it is impossible to prescribe unless one can first describe, which is one of the 
purposes of scientific enquiry or controlled experimentation. Kerlinger (1986) defines 
theory as “a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that 
present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the 
purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena” (1986, p. 9). This would seem to be 
an adequate representation of the Hunt-Vitell General Theory o f Marketing Ethics. If its 
relationships continue to stand up adequately under empirical testing, researchers will 
have better justification for explanation and prediction; that is, to derive normative 
implications.
Conceptual Model of Dissertation
The major focus of this dissertation research is to find a way to measure the 
relative influence of deontological and teleological evaluations in a marketer’s ethical 
judgment. According to Hunt and Vitell (1986), it is important to include perceived 
ethical problem as a triggering mechanism, so this construct is included, too. The model 
also tests relationships involving three background factors (or exogenous constructs). 
Corporate ethical values, an organizational variable, has been relatively well defined and 
found to be salient in a number of studies (e.g., Hunt, Wood and Chonko 1989, 
Singhapakdi et al. 1995). The two individual variables that this study examines are 
religiousness and relativism. Religiousness was selected as an individual variable that
20
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might be expected to be strongly related to deontological norms; relativism because it 
should correlate highly with teleological considerations. Religiousness is also o f  interest 
because of the religious revival currently going on in the United States and elsewhere. 
John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, in their book Megatrends 2000 (1990) identify “the 
religious revival o f the new millennium” as one o f ten megatrends of which marketers 
should be aware, because o f their broad societal influence. It has also proved significant 
in a number of empirical studies of ethical decision making (e.g., McNichoIs and 
Zimmerer 1985; Kennedy and Lawton 1998). The research will also test the relationship 
between ethical judgment and ethical intentions, in an effort to get as close to behavior as 
possible, in a study of this nature.
Endogenous Constructs
The first construct in the structural model is the trigger mechanism, perceived 
ethical problem. Those who perceive an ethical problem then engage in a process o f 
moral reflection, definition and, unless prevented by situational constraints, action. 
Reflection is characterized by deontological and teleological evaluations, which are 
weighed together in an individual’s ethical judgment. The HV model shows ethical 
intentions further moderated by an estimate of the results o f a particular ethical judgment, 
though that relationship will not be tested in this study.
21
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Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
Moral theory is an immense subject, though business ethicists have studied it 
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Figure 2-7. Moral Theory (Schwartz 1996, p. 15)
A few scholars in marketing ethics have adopted the moral virtue approach (e.g., 
Williams and Murphy 1990), but have, as yet, produced no positive theory. The approach
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is promising for marketing researchers, however, especially with the growth of interest in 
trust and commitment in relationship marketing.
The other two categories, teleology and deontology, are specified in the HV 
model. Although the distinction between the two can become very niggling at times1, 
most ethicists describe deontological reasoning as focusing on the specific action or 
behavior, while teleological reasoning measures its consequences. As De George (1990) 
writes:
Deontologists maintain that actions are morally right or wrong independent of 
their consequences. Moral rightness and wrongness are basic and ultimate moral 
terms. They do not depend on good and the production of, or failure to produce, 
good. One’s duty is to do what is morally right and to avoid what is morally 
wrong, irrespective of the consequences of so doing (De George 1990, p. 63).
A deontologist believes, therefore, that one shouldn’t break a contract simply because it is 
wrong to break contracts. Calling rightness and wrongness “basic and ultimate moral 
terms” means that consideration o f the consequences of an action is peripheral and 
unnecessary. Some strict deontologists even believe that weighing consequences is 
immoral in itself. Deontology is firmly established in Western moral philosophy, through 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, the influence of Greek moral philosophers like Socrates and 
Plato, and the very significant German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
Examples o f deontological norms include the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, and 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which states that one should “act only according to that
1 De George (1990) describes rule utilitarianism as a moral philosophy that holds that “utility applies appropriately to 
classes o f actions rather than to given individual actions. Thus, by looking at the general consequences o f breaking 
contracts in the past, we can determine that breaking contracts is immoral. It is immoral because the bad 
consequences outweigh the good consequences. We thus arrive at a rule stating that it is morally wrong to violate 
contracts. By a similar analysis a rule utilitarian determines that people should not lie, steal, or murder" (De George
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maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (De 
George 1990, p. 69). A central condition for all these norms is that human beings are de 
facto worthy of respect, either because they are related as children o f one Creator (Judeo- 
Christian tradition; the Ten Commandments), or because we must accord others the 
respect we desire ourselves (Golden Rule; Categorical Imperative). Kant formulated this 
condition as the second version of his Categorical Imperative: “Act so that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that o f  another, always as an end and never 
as a means only” (De George 1990, p. 69). The two main problems for deontologists are 
to determine “the ‘best’ set of rules to live by” (Hunt and Vitell 1986, p. 759) and what 
happens when two or more duties come into conflict.
Teleologists, on the other hand, believe that what one should assess is the relative 
merit of all the consequences of a particular behavior, so a behavior is declared good if it 
produces more good than bad consequences. Breaking a contract could be good in some 
situations and bad in others. There are a number o f teleological theories, based on whose 
good is to be considered. Ethical egoism centers on the idea that one should make moral 
decisions based on the greatest good for oneself. Utilitarianism is often summarized by 
saying that an action is right if it produces the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people. Robin and Reidenbach (1987) write that this philosophy has been central for 
many businesspeople, “in part because of its tradition in economics.. .Capitalistic 
systems, by providing the greatest material good for the greatest number, are considered 
ethical from a perspective of economic philosophy” (Robin and Reidenbach 1987, p. 47).
1990, p. 48). The distinction between such “rules" and what a deontologist perceives as "duties” is certainly very
24
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There are a number o f objections to teleological reasoning, and no moral 
philosopher advocates a purely teleological approach; based on such an approach one 
could find moral justification for the Holocaust or slavery by placing a high value on a 
pure society or very high agricultural production. The standard objections include, first, 
the practical problem of the time required to consider all the consequences of an action 
before doing it. Second, many claim that it is impossible to know all the consequences of 
an action at any given point in time. Third, whose good is to be considered and how is it 
apportioned? Are we to consider numbers or aggregate good? De George (1990) offers an 
example:
Action results in 1,000 units of good for 100 people and 10 units o f good for 
9,900 people. Action B results in 19.9 units of good for each o f the 10,000 
people. In both cases we have a total o f 199,000 units of good. If the resulting 
good at issue is the standard of living o f a community, utilitarianism would have 
us conclude that there is no moral difference between the two cases (De George 
1990, p. 52).
Because of the weaknesses of both approaches, many moral philosophers 
advocate a mixed system, which has the distinct advantage of being practical: this is how 
most people actually do ethics. In marketing ethics research into the core of the HV 
model, Mayo and Marks (1990) found that marketing researchers used both kinds of 
moral reasoning, with the teleological effect the stronger of the two. As they concede, 
however, their operationalization of the constructs was somewhat problematic. Hunt and 
Vasquez-Parraga (1993), in probably the most definitive empirical work on this subject to 
date, determined that marketers rely primarily on deontological factors (partial R2 =
slight indeed.
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
.7131), and only secondarily on teleological considerations (partial R2 = .0116). This 
study had extremely high goodness-of-fit indices (.999 and .994); the structural equations 
model fit the data “like a glove” (Hunt and Vitell 1993, p. 779). Vitell and Hunt (1990) 
found respondents using both types of evaluation, though their focus was not on 
comparing effects o f deontological and teleological evaluations, but on the relative 
importance of rewards versus punishment. Akaah (1997) confirmed that deontological 
considerations were primary, in a survey of a sample of American Marketing Association 
(AMA) members.
The hypotheses about deontological and teleological evaluations are embedded in 
the following sections.
Perceived Ethical Problem
Calling perceived ethical problem (PEP) the triggering mechanism refers to the 
fact that if individuals are not aware that an ethical dilemma exists, they do not engage in 
any process o f moral reflection. Jones (1991) calls it recognition of a moral issue. In a 
study relating Machiavellianism to perceived ethical problem, which has clear relevance 
for the current work on relativism and perceived ethical problem, Singhapakdi (1993) 
found high Machiavellianism to be significantly and inversely related to ethical 
perception. This was consistent with past studies (e.g., Hegarty and Sims 1978, 1979; 
Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990). In a study that operationalized elements from the HV 
model and the Jones dimensions o f moral intensity, Singhapakdi et al. (1996) found that 
higher moral intensity related to greater ethical perception. Vitell et al. (1993) proposed
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that there would be differences between countries in perception of ethical problems, 
based on Hofstede’s (1980) masculinity/femininity dimension. Singhapakdi et al. (1994) 
confirmed such differences, in a sample o f Thai and American marketers.
Most studies, however, assume this stage away by presenting respondents with a 
scenario termed an ethical dilemma. The main interest has been how marketers deal with 
moral situations after they recognize them. Sparks and Hunt (1998) operationalized 
ethical sensitivity (listed as a personal characteristic in the HV model), based on a 
conceptualization that it means one of two things: either “the ability to recognize that a 
decision making situation has ethical content” or “the ability to recognize that a decision 
making situation has ethical content and the ascription o f importance to the ethical issues 
comprising that content” (Sparks and Hunt 1998, p. 95). They did not, however, test the 
relationship between ethical sensitivity and perceived ethical problem, as specified in the 
HV model. The three hypotheses that test the relationships between PEP and the three 
exogenous variables are summarized in the foregoing sections. The research also tests the 
relationship between PEP and ethical judgment (EJ):
HI a. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem 
are more likely to form an ethical judgment.
H lb. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem 
are more likely to make a deontological evaluation.
H lc. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem 
are more likely to make a teleological evaluation.
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Ethical Judgment
Hunt and Vitell (1986. p. 763) define ethical judgment as “the belief that a 
particular alternative is the most ethical alternative” and model the construct at the 
juncture between deontological and teleological evaluations. In other words, an individual 
collects all the deontological and teleological factors that he or she perceives as relevant 
to the moral issue, weighs them, and arrives at an ethical judgment. Hunt and Vitell 
postulate that there are few instances when individuals form ethical judgments based 
solely on one type of evaluation. According to the model, ethical judgment affects 
behavior through the intervention of ethical intentions, modified by a further, issue- 
specific teleological evaluation. Mayo and Marks (1990) confirmed that ethical 
judgments were jointly determined by deontological and teleological evaluations. Hunt 
and Vasquez-Parraga (1993, p. 87), surveying a sample of 747 sales and marketing 
managers, also found that deontological and teleological evaluations “explain a high 
proportion of the variance of ethical judgment.”
To summarize, then, Mayo and Marks (1990) found the teleological evaluation 
(Teleo) to be more important, but the study was somewhat flawed. Both the Akaah (1997) 
and Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993) studies concluded that marketers relied more 
heavily on the deontological evaluation (Deon). Therefore, the core o f this research tests 
the way marketers balance Deon and Teleo in arriving at judgments o f the morality of a 
situation, depending on the latter two studies as to the direction of the hypothesis:
H2a. Marketers who make a deontological evaluation are more likely to form an 
ethical judgment.
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H2b. Marketers who make a teleological evaluation are more likely to form an 
ethical judgment.
H2c. Marketers rely more heavily on deontological than teleological evaluations 
in making ethical judgments.
Ethical Intentions
Earlier in this literature review, the author noted that the HV model specifies a 
moderating teleological evaluation between ethical judgment and ethical intention. The 
current study does not test this relationship, though other researchers have done so (e.g., 
Mayo and Marks 1990, Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993). As Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 
(1993, p. 79) note: “Hunt and Vitell theorize that in most situations intentions are 
congruent with ethical judgments and behavior is congruent with intentions. They further 
theorize that there is no direct path from deontological evaluation to intentions.” Akaah 
(1997, p. 77) confirmed the first conjecture: “In terms of relative influence, marketing 
professionals rely primarily on ethical judgments and secondarily on teleological factors 
in making intention evaluations.” Singhapakdi et al. (1996) tested ethical intention as 
related to the moral intensity inherent in a situation. A number o f researchers have 
confirmed the relationship between ethical judgment and ethical intentions (e.g., Mayo 
and Marks 1990, Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993, Bass, Barnett and Brown 1999). The 
hypothesis that tests ethical intention, therefore, assesses the relationship with ethical 
judgment:
H3. Marketers who form an ethical judgment will have more ethical intentions.
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Exogenous Constructs
Ford and Richardson (1994, p. 206), in their review of empirical literature on 
ethical decision making, conclude that “individual factors have received by far the most 
research attention in the empirical literature.” This research follows that pattern, with two 
of the background factors being individual and one organizational. All three have been 
operationalized previously; those for religiousness have proven relatively unreliable, so 
this research contributes a new way to operationalize this important construct.
Religiousness
Religion/religiosity/religiousness seems to fall into a forlorn category in ethics 
research; people seem at a loss to define or describe it, but they “know it when they see 
it.” Even Hunt and Vitell (1993) seem somewhat at a loss:
Unquestionably, an individual’s personal religion influences ethical decision 
making. A priori, compared with nonreligious people, one might suspect that 
the highly religious people would have more clearly defined deontological 
norms and that such norms would play a stronger role in ethical judgments 
(p. 780).
They are left to fall back on a priori assumptions primarily because the work 
toward measurement o f  religiousness has generally occurred in the fields of psychology, 
theology and sociology. The one that Hunt and Vitell (1993) mention is an exception, 
having been developed by Wilkes, Bumett and Howell (1986) to measure religiosity as it 
affects consumer behavior. There are, however, two important problems with this 
measure: (1) it contains only four items, one of which (self-described religiousness) might
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be considered a single-item measure of the construct, and (2) the reliability o f the scale 
was quite low (a  = .49 in the WBH study). Another contribution of this dissertation, then, 
will be to test a more reliable and comprehensive religiousness measure for marketing 
researchers.
There has been extensive scientific research done on religiousness, but, as with 
many constructs in the social sciences, no measure seems capable of capturing its domain 
effectively and efficiently. In general business research, the most frequently cited scale is 
clearly the “Religious Orientation” scale by Gordon Allport (1967), which discerns two 
dimensions: intrinsic religiousness and extrinsic religiousness. This is useful for business 
research because it distinguishes between people for whom religion is an expedient 
(extrinsics) and others for whom it is the central focus o f their lives (intrinsics). Indeed, 
research using this distinction (e.g., Wiebe and Fleck 1980) finds significant differences 
between the two types in such areas as moral standards, conscientiousness and traditional 
attitudes. But though Allport is cited most often, there are numerous other studies, which 
analyze religiousness on literally dozens of potential dimensions. Some of them are more 
psychologically oriented (e.g., cultic practices [Fukuyama 1961], devotionalism [King 
and Hunt 1972]) and have, therefore, few implications for marketers. The construct must 
be bounded before marketing researchers can operationalize it usefully.
Religiousness is almost indefinable. Whatever it is, it is broadly and deeply 
interwoven in personality and culture. Sociological measures attempt to discern its 
influence on cultural processes. In a paper discussing the sociological measurement o f 
religiousness, Fichter (1969) wrote that “the subjective ‘experiential’ dimension o f
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religiosity is sociologically irrelevant.. .what needs special attention here is the religious 
fact of social communion, fellowship, or association” (p. 172). Psychological measures 
focus on religiousness as motivation, a personality variable, or a cognitive style 
(Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990). Different measures are necessary for different purposes, 
though the cognitive psychological approach is often most appropriate for marketing 
research (Malhotra et al. 1996).
For marketing, an important question is how religiousness affects behavior, but 
especially spending behavior. It is interesting that none of the scales explicitly measures 
attitudes and behavior regarding money. Nonetheless, Christians are aware that Jesus 
Christ had firm opinions about money, more so than on most other subjects. Islamic 
banking is becoming a force in the U.S., extended from the Middle East. Jews buy kosher 
food and support kibbutzes in Israel. One of the purposes of this scale, then, is to measure 
this dimension o f religiousness. This is another reason why Allport’s Intrinsic-Extrinsic 
orientation measurement is not very useful in marketing research; extrinsics do not 
interest marketers because their religiousness is not likely to affect their spending. 
Extrinsics are religious when it is convenient to be so (Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990, 
quoting Donahue 1985, note that the Extrinsic scale “does a good job of measuring the 
sort o f religion that gives religion a bad name” p. 447), which means they will probably 
not adjust their behavior for the sake of religious beliefs. We do need, however, to 
measure intrinsic religiousness, going beyond personality and cognitive effects to how, 
why, when and where people spend their money.
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Beyond behavior, though, are the affective dimensions o f religiousness; as Schwab 
and Petersen (1990) write, “religiousness strongly influences our emotional experience, 
our thinking, and our behavior” (p. 335). Marketing ethics research, in particular, would 
be poorly served by a scale that focused solely on how people spend their money. 
Religiousness affects personal moral philosophies, and thus ethical judgments (Barnett, 
Bass and Brown 1996); the motivational aspects (at least) should be o f interest to 
marketing managers. This scale, therefore, attempts also to measure affective 
religiousness.
Another possible dimension is what might be termed “responsibility.” If people 
consider themselves religious, does it then follow that they are responsible to act or 
believe (not act or not believe) in specific ways? This is what might be termed a bridge 
law, in that it is a means of getting from one place to another. Most studies assume the 
bridge away, asking people about their beliefs and actions, but rarely trying to determine 
whether there is a causal relationship between the two. Responsibility, then, attempts to 
establish whether people perceive a necessary connection between religious belief and 
specific actions. Specifically, this study tests the effect of a person’s religiousness on 
perception of an ethical problem and their tendency to rely more on deontological or 
teleological evaluations.
H4a. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her perception of an 
ethical problem.
H4b. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her tendency to rely 
more on a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H4c. A marketer’s religiousness is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely 
more on a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
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Corporate Ethical Values
Values are deeply embedded in human personality and society and, therefore, the 
literature reflects contributions from numerous disciplines, including anthropology, 
sociology and psychology. According to Vinson, Scott and Lamont (1977, p. 45), 
following mainly a psychological definition for application to consumer behavior, values 
fall into three categories: global or generalized, domain-specific, and evaluations of 
product attributes. Rokeach, perhaps the most influential scholar in values research in 
psychology, defined a value as “a centrally held, enduring belief which guides actions and 
judgments across specific situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate end- 
states o f existence” (Rokeach 1968, p. 161). Values are generally considered to be 
“highly influential in directing the actions o f individuals in society in general and 
organizations in particular” (Hunt, Wood and Chonko 1989, p. 80). If we adopt the 
Vinson et al. (1977) categories, values that direct individual action within organizations 
are domain-specific; that is, “people acquire values through experiences in specific 
situations or domains of activity and that behavior cannot be understood or efficiently 
predicted except in the context o f  a specific environment” (Vinson et al. 1977, p. 45). In a 
widely read book about companies that maintain a high standard of excellence, Peters and 
Waterman (1982) conclude that almost all o f these firms have a highly developed set of 
shared values at the core of their organizations, including those related to corporate 
ethics.
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Marketing research has indeed confirmed that environment has significant 
influence on values, specifically ethical values. Many empirical studies (e.g., Brenner and 
Molander 1977, Hegarty and Sims 1978) confirm that an organization’s ethical norms are 
a major factor influencing moral decision making. Laczniak and Interrieden (1987), using 
an in-basket experimental design, found the organization’s ethical stance did effect a 
change in employee behavior, but only significantly when top management concern was 
enhanced with codes o f ethics and tangible rewards and sanctions. Akaah and Riordan 
(1989) found that a healthier ethical environment led to stronger ethical stands.
Hunt, Wood and Chonko (1989) conceptualized corporate ethical values (CEV) as 
that subset o f all corporate cultural values (e.g., pricing policies, treatment of employees, 
environmental policies) that have ethical dimensions. They postulated that companies 
with higher corporate ethical values would have higher employee organizational 
commitment. The results o f their study o f over 1,200 marketing professionals confirmed a 
strong positive association between the two variables. Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993) 
also confirmed a significant relationship between ethical behavior and an organization’s 
culture. Their results supported “the view that a culture emphasizing ethical values may 
be best developed and maintained by having salespeople and their supervisors internalize 
a set of deontological norms proscribing a set of behaviors that are inappropriate, “just 
not done,” and prescribing a set o f behaviors that are appropriate, “this is the way we do 
things” (Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993, p. 87, italics in original). Singhapakdi et al. 
(1995), using Hunt, Wood and Chonko’s scale, confirmed that “corporate ethical values 
positively influence a marketer’s perceptions of the importance of ethics and social 
responsibility in achieving organizational effectiveness” (1995, p. 53).
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Based on the foregoing empirical and theoretical work, then, this study tests the 
following hypothesized relationships involving corporate ethical values:
H5a. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be 
more perceptive o f ethical problems.
H5b. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be 
more likely to rely on deontological evaluations when making an ethical 
judgment.
H5c. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be 
more likely to rely on teleological evaluations when making an ethical 
judgment.
Relativism
Forsyth (1980, 1992) developed scales to measure what he termed personal moral 
philosophies— idealism and relativism. His belief is that these dimensions parallel the 
moral philosophical components in the ethics models; specifically, that idealism relates 
generally to deontological reasoning, and relativism to teleological reasoning. The 
difference between moral philosophies and personal moral philosophies is that the latter 
are tailored to the individual. Each person makes value judgments based on his or her 
own integrated conceptual system, or personal moral philosophy. Forsyth (1992, p. 462) 
writes that “although the number of personal moral philosophies is unlimited, most can 
be contrasted in terms of relativism or idealism.”
Relativism, according to Forsyth, is a personal moral philosophy based on 
skepticism. Relativists “generally feel that moral actions depend upon the nature of the 
situation and the individuals involved, and when judging others they weigh the 
circumstances more than the ethical principle that was violated” (Forsyth 1992, p. 462).
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Idealism, by contrast, requires that adherents act in accord with moral laws, norms and 
principles. It “describes the individual’s concern for the welfare o f others. Highly 
idealistic individuals feel that harming others is always avoidable, and they would rather 
not choose between the lesser of two evils which will lead to negative consequences for 
other people” (Forsyth 1992, p. 462).
A number o f marketing ethics studies have adopted Forsyth’s dichotomy. 
Singhapakdi el al. (1995) found both dimensions were significantly related, in opposite 
directions, to a marketer’s perception about the importance of ethics and social 
responsibility to their organization’s effectiveness. Highly idealistic marketers tended to 
perceive that ethics were important and high relativists believed the opposite. A cross- 
cultural study (Singhapakdi et al. 1994) confirmed differences between Thai and 
American marketers on the idealism/relativism dimension, but also found idealism to be a 
weaker discriminator than relativism. Sparks and Hunt (1998) and Shaub (1989) 
confirmed a negative relationship between relativism and ethical sensitivity. Sparks and 
Hunt (1998, p. 105) speculate that “disbelief in moral absolutes might reduce the 
likelihood o f ethical violations standing out among other issues. In a world where all 
issues are relativistic shades of gray, ethical issues might blend in with everything else” 
and “relativists might consider ethical issues in general to be less important than 
nonrelativists.” The current research investigates the effects of relativism only, not 
idealism.
Ethical relativism, according to De George (1990) “implies that moral principles 
are not right or wrong and cannot be rationally defended; yet moral principles frequently
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have been given rational defense, and disagreements on moral issues are argued in 
rational as well as in emotional terms” (De George 1990, p. 35). As this quote implies, a 
strong form of relativism has little support among moral philosophers, though Robin and 
Reidenbach (1993) argue that a bounded relativism is precisely what marketing should 
look toward in developing a workable ethical philosophy. This is especially important in 
international marketing, they believe, because history, time and context make important 
differences in the meaning of “ethical”; “practically and demonstrably, there are very real 
differences in social expectations among cultures, and concerns about these differences 
may be exacerbated as societies become more economically interdependent” (Robin and 
Reidenbach 1993, p. 99).
Although Forsyth’s original description of relativism related it to teleological 
evaluations o f moral dilemmas, the relationship has not been empirically tested, to the 
author’s knowledge. Studies have used either idealism/relativism or deontology/teleology 
and the distinctions are sometimes far from clear. This study will preserve Forsyth’s 
assumption that relativism is a personal moral philosophy, by testing a model that 
specifies it as a personal characteristic in the HV theoretical structure. Individuals whose 
conceptual structure of morality leans toward relativism should tend to evaluate moral 
situations based on their results, rather than deontological ideas o f right and wrong.
Based on the literature, therefore, this research will test the following 
hypothesized relationships:
H6a. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her perception of an 
ethical problem.
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
H6b. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely 
more on a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H6c. A marketer’s relativism is positively related to his or her tendency to rely 
more on a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H6d. Relativistic marketers rely more on teleological than on deontological 
evaluations in making an ethical judgment.
Covariates
Researchers have tested dozens of demographic and organizational covariates in 
empirical studies o f business ethics. Smith and Cooper-Martin (1997) reported significant 
differences in ethical perception based on age, sex and race. Singhapakdi and Vitell 
(1991) found no significant relationship between the sex o f a marketer and his or her 
deontological norms. Ford and Richardson (1994), in a review of the literature on ethical 
decision making, listed research on religion, nationality, sex, age, type of education, years 
of education, employment, income, years of employment, Machiavellianism, locus of 
control, and several others. Among the situational factors that have been researched are 
peer group influence, top management influence, effect o f codes o f ethics and ethical 
culture, organization level, degree of industry competitiveness, and industry type. This 
research measures the influence o f six covariates: age, income, sex, years of education, 
type of education, and religion.
The Model and Research Hypotheses
Figure 2-8 is a pictorial representation of the hypothesized relationships in this 
dissertation research, as described in the preceding review o f literature.
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Figure 2-8. Dissertation model, with hypothesized variable relationships
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Summary o f  Research Hypotheses
Perception of an Ethical Problem
HI a. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem are 
more likely to form an ethical judgment.
Hlb. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem are 
more likely to make a deontological evaluation.
Hlc. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem are 
more likely to make a teleological evaluation.
Ethical Judgment
H2a. Marketers who make a deontological evaluation are more likely to form an ethical 
judgment.
H2b. Marketers who make a teleological evaluation are more likely to form an ethical 
judgment.
H2c. Marketers rely more heavily on deontological than teleological evaluations in 
making ethical judgments.
Ethical Intentions
H3. Marketers who form an ethical judgment will have more ethical intentions.
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Summary o f  Research Hypotheses (continued)
Religiousness/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
H4a. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her perception of an
ethical problem.
H4b. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her tendency to rely more
on a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H4c. A marketer’s religiousness is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely more
on a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
Corporate Ethical Values/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
H5a. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be more 
perceptive o f ethical problems.
H5b. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be more 
likely to rely on deontological evaluations when making an ethical judgment.
H5c. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be more 
likely to rely on teleological evaluations when making an ethical judgment.
Relativism/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
H6a. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her perception of an ethical 
problem.
H6b. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely more on
a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H6c. A marketer’s relativism is positively related to his or her tendency to rely more on
a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H6d. Relativistic marketers rely more on teleological than on deontological evaluations
in making an ethical judgment.
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Chapter III 
Methodology and Procedures
The full explication of marketing ethics research based on the Hunt-Vitell model 
in the preceding chapter sets the stage for the research design described in this chapter. 
Specifically, this empirical test should provide an analysis into the ways in which 
marketers make ethical judgments, and to what extent they rely on deontological and 
teleological evaluations. This chapter describes the empirical work, from research design 
and construct operationalization through data collection and analysis techniques.
Research Design
This research might be considered nonexperimental, because subjects were not 
assigned to treatments. The subjects were AMA members willing to fill in and return 
identical questionnaires. According to Spector (19), however, the distinction between 
experimental and nonexperimental research designs is somewhat fluid: “the 
experimental/nonexperimental distinction represents two ends of a continuum rather than 
two distinct types” (p. 9). In addition to the criterion of subject assignment, 
nonexperimental designs usually involve very minor, if any, manipulation o f subjects and 
conditions. In this research, the purpose o f the scenario technique was precisely to 
experiment with different conditions under which subjects might come to varying 
conclusions on ethical questions. Since the conclusions that derive from this work result 
directly from the manipulation of conditions, through scenarios, the design should be 
considered experimental.
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Scenarios in Ethics Research
Social science research poses numerous measurement problems, and ethics study 
is no exception. The use o f scenarios is considered a projective technique, which is 
always vulnerable to criticism that people do not always act as they say they will. As 
Converse and Presser (1986) write: “If we ask a hypothetical question, will we get a 
hypothetical answer?” (p. 23). They note, in response, that hypothetical questions can be 
valuable in certain types of research, where they “represent an effort to standardize a 
stimulus because actual experiences range so widely” (p. 23, italics in original). They also 
note that the technique makes the process easier for respondents:
To respondents, vignettes offer concrete, detailed situations on which to 
make judgments rather than the demand for abstract generalizations. Even 
though the questions are hypothetical, vignettes reduce the need for 
respondents to be insightful and conscious of their own thought processes 
(P- 26).
In order to compensate for the uncertainties of the technique, they suggest that researchers 
probe for background information about respondents’ frames o f  reference in particular 
responses. This research does precisely that, by measuring a number of antecedent 
variables and covariates.
In terms of this specific stream of research, Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 11) write 
that the scenario technique is “well established in ethics research and. . .a suitable vehicle 
for early research efforts.” One might complain that research based on the HV model 
hardly qualifies as “early efforts,” but the particular goal o f quantifying the use of 
deontological and teleological evaluative techniques is certainly in a formative stage. The
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use of an established method should testify to the validity of the results. Ethics 
researchers have used the scenario technique generally, as in marketing ethics work (e.g., 
Akaah 1997), and more specifically, in evaluations o f  international ethical decision­
making (e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 1997) and in particular environments (e.g., marketing 
research: Sparks and Hunt 1998). This survey used three scenarios to test perceived 
ethical problem, deontological and teleological evaluations, ethical judgment, and ethical 
intentions. Two of these scenarios (from Domoff and Tankersley [1975]) have been used 
successfully in past studies (e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 1996, Singhapakdi et al. 1997). The 
third scenario is an adaptation o f one Sparks and Hunt (1998) developed to measure 
ethical sensitivity of marketing researchers. The adaptation was necessary because their 
scenario was quite long, containing three ethical dilemmas o f varying seriousness. The 
scenario for this research retained only one moral issue.
Conceptualization and Operationalization
The following section provides an explanation of how each construct in the model 
was operationalized. As noted in the literature review section, the current study tested 
three constructs that are exogenous in the model: religiousness, relativism and corporate 
ethical values. All fit within the first stage of the Hunt-Vitell model, as personal 
characteristics (religiousness, relativism) or as a part o f the marketer’s organizational 
environment (corporate ethical values). The rest o f the model represents the core of HV: 
perceived ethical problem (PEP), ethical judgment (EJ), deontological and teleological 
evaluations (Deon and Teleo), and ethical intention (El). PEP, EJ, and El are
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operationalized as in previous studies, but Deon and Teleo were tested in a new way that 
makes it possible to assess how marketers weigh the two types o f evaluations.
Exogenous Variables
Two of the exogenous variables are personal characteristics, chosen because they 
should have strong relationships to the two different types of moral evaluations tested in 
this study. Religiousness should correlate strongly with deontological thinking, while 
relativism should show high correlation with teleological reasoning. Corporate ethical 
values measures environmental effects on moral reasoning, at least those present within 
the marketer’s organization.
Religiousness
As noted in the previous chapter, this study used a newly developed scale (Marta 
1998)1 to measure religiousness. Previous scales are either very psychologically oriented, 
ignoring behavior, and especially spending behavior, or relatively unreliable (the Wilkes, 
Burnett and Howell [1986] scale, used in several studies of marketing ethics, had a 
reliability of a  = .49). The sample o f 151 was not random, because the scale is designed 
to measure religiousness over several religions (Hindu, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim); 
the method was, therefore, non-probability quota sampling, to ensure a large enough 
group in each cell. Exploratory factor analysis (principal axis factoring) revealed that 
eight items measured a unidimensional structure, explaining 58.3% of the sample 
variance. Intercorrelations were good (KMO = .913) and reliability excellent (a  = .91).
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But one might ask (as indeed someone did during a focus group), “Why do 
marketing researchers need a scale at all? Why not use self-evaluation? Let people define 
themselves as religious or not; that way you don’t have to take the responsibility for 
measuring it.” The answer is that self-evaluation should certainly be part o f any 
instrument that marketers use, because of the probability that conscious awareness o f 
religiousness is likely to affect behavior. Nonetheless, religiousness is a large construct, 
and, as Churchill writes (1979, p. 66): “Marketers are much better served with multi-item 
than single-item measures o f  their constructs, and they should take the time to develop 
them.” The original set of items, therefore, contained a self-described religiousness item, 
in order to help establish validity of the instrument. Seven o f the eight items used in the 
present study correlated strongly (.48-65) with self-described religiousness; the eighth 
correlated less strongly (.28), but was retained because o f strong intercorrelations with the 
other items. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .931.
Besides the obvious question about whether self-description should be ever 
considered an entirely accurate indicator, the item is particularly suspect in the context o f 
religiousness. Many believe that it is prideful to say they are highly religious, as if  they 
were claiming similarity to Mother Teresa or Moses. The resulting items in the scale, 
therefore, do not include self-description, but do take correlation into account. In 
summary, given its excellent initial results, the scale seems appropriate for exploratory 
use in this study.
1 This paper has not been published, but is available upon request from the author. Results from the dissertation sample 
will be incorporated before it is sent for potential publication.
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Corporate Ethical Values
Hunt, Wood, and Chonko (1989) developed the scale to measure corporate ethical 
values (CEV), defined as “a composite of the individual ethical values o f managers and 
both the formal and informal policies on ethics o f the organization” (p. 79). There are five 
items on the CEV scale, which are measured by a seven-point agree/disagree scale, for 
which Hunt, Wood and Chonko reported an a  o f .84. A high score on the CEV scale 
indicates that the marketer works in a corporate environment that emphasizes ethical 
values. The scale has been validated in a number o f other studies, including Singhapakdi 
et al. 1997 (a  = .84) and Singhapakdi et al. 1995 (a  = .85).
Relativism
Most o f the empirical work in marketing ethics has measured relativism using 
Forsyth’s Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), published in 1980, which contains ten- 
item scales to measure both relativism and idealism. Recently, however, Sparks and Hunt 
(1998) reported that a number of Forsyth’s items exhibited psychometric difficulties, so 
they created a new, and shorter, scale. Of the five items, three are the Forsyth items that 
performed best in the Shaub (1989) study. The other two items were original. The shorter 
scale proved to have higher reliability (a  = .87 in Sparks and Hunt 1998) than Forsyth’s 
original ten items ( a  = .81).
Endogenous Variables
Perceived ethical problem is endogenous in this model, because it is influenced by 
relativism, religiousness, and corporate ethical values before it affects ethical judgment.
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The model also measures the effect of the exogenous variables on the deontological 
(Deon) and teleological (Teleo) evaluations, which together account for much of the 
variance o f ethical judgment. The final stage is when the marketer establishes an ethical 
intention.
Perceived Ethical Problem
This construct was measured by a single item. After respondents have read a 
scenario, the questionnaire asks that they express their degree o f agreement (on a seven- 
point Likert-type scale where 1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely agree) with the 
statement: “The situation above involves the [salesperson] in an ethical problem.” The 
use o f a single-item measure for this construct is consistent with previous research (e.g., 
Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990, Singhapakdi 1993) and intuitively satisfying. Perception is 
a type of sight, which is measured by a single test that determines how clearly one can 
discern an object. A one-item scaled measure functions in an identical manner: one either 
perceives an ethical problem or doesn’t, and beyond that the scaled nature of the item 
captures how distinctly one perceives it to be a problem.
Ethical Judgment
This study also measured ethical judgment through one item, which asks 
respondents to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with the action 
described in the scenario (“Please rate the marketer’s action as to how ethical you believe 
it was”), measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = very unethical, 7 = very 
ethical). This operationalization is consistent with previous measurements of this variable 
(e.g., Mayo and Marks 1990, Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993, Singhapakdi and Vitell
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1993, Singhapakdi et al. 1994). O f these studies, Mayo and Marks (1990, p. 166) worded 
the question most specifically “to reflect the notion than an ethical judgment is presumed 
to be influenced by both deontological and teleological evaluations,” by asking 
respondents to consider both outcomes and their own values in rating how' ethical they 
believed the action (of the marketer in the scenario) was. In a commentary on their 
operationalization, however, Hunt (1990) points out that an individual’s use of both types 
o f evaluation is hypothesized by the HV model and, therefore, researchers may bias 
results by any wording implying that respondents must use both evaluations in any ethical 
decision. This study, therefore, followed Hunt’s (1990) suggested wording, as do the 
other three studies cited above.
Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
This study operationalized Deon and Teleo in a different manner than have 
previous studies, in an attempt to solve two problems from previous empirical work. The 
first is definitional. Are Deon and Teleo constructs or processes? Hunt (1990) identifies 
this issue, in his critique of the Mayo and Marks (1990) operationalization, and states that 
he believes deontological and teleological evaluations are processes. The measurement, 
therefore, should be “inferred from measures of deontological norms applied to each 
alternative” (Hunt 1990, p. 175). The second problem relates to measurement, which 
involves at least two issues: (1) how to determine to what extent respondents use Deon as 
opposed to Teleo, and (2) how to describe deontological norms so they imply nothing 
consequential. Hunt (1990), for example, criticized Mayo and Marks’ (1990) work in 
terms of the second issue: “at least five of the seven items included in the ‘deontological
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norm’ scale refer to the consequences of behaviors and, therefore, are teleological in 
nature rather than deontological” (Hunt 1990, p. 176).
( The current operationalization attempts to address all o f these issues. In terms of
deontological norms, the problem often seems to be that researchers tend to become too 
descriptive. Deontological norms are, by nature, simple and uncomplicated. “Thou shalt 
not kill” and “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” are straightforward; 
they imply no assessment of whether the consequences might change the prescription. By 
adding just a few more words, however, researchers have sometimes turned a statement 
o f a deontological norm into one that implies consequences. That is the difference, for 
example, between the simple deontological norm “This action is unethical, because lying 
is wrong” and a very slight adaptation that may tend to suggest consequences: “This 
action is unethical, because lying is wrong in this situation.” The deontological norms 
tested in this investigation are purposefully simple statements about right and wrong.
Finally, the current operationalization attempts to deal with the evaluations as a 
process and to weigh them against each other, using what Converse and Presser (1986) 
call a magnitude estimation scale. Respondents read the scenario, then respond as to 
whether they perceive an ethical problem (PEP) and whether they would act as the 
marketer did in the scenario (EJ). If their answer to the latter question indicates they think 
the action was unethical to any extent at all, they then evaluate six statements, three of 
which represent applicable deontological norms. The other three suggest negative 
consequences that might, realistically, result from the unethical action. The respondent is
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instructed to choose the statement that seems most important for their personal evaluation 
and write “ 100” next to it. The next step is to weigh the other five statements against the 
most important one, and assign a number less than 100 to each. The advantage of this 
type of scale is that it is much less constrained, so it can capture more variation. Converse 
and Presser (1986, p. 30) report that Lodge’s (1981) study showed “an increase of 12%— 
15% in variance explained from the use o f magnitude over ordinal scaling.” The main 
problem in this kind of measurement is to “make use o f the interesting properties o f these 
measures without incurring unduly heavy tasks for the respondent or unacceptable losses 
of information” (Converse and Presser 1986, p. 31). This, then, was an important 
question in pretesting; do respondents truly understand the task, or is it simply so 
different from the usual survey techniques that they become confused?
Ethical Intention
We measure respondents’ ethical intentions using the same scenarios, to which 
they responded by registering how likely it was that they would act as [the marketer] did 
(1 = very likely, 7 = very unlikely). The scenarios are examples o f marketing behaviors 
that are generally considered unethical (e.g., deception, doctoring research results), so 
agreement with the action indicates less ethical intentions. The use of a single-item 
measure for this construct, as with perception of an ethical problem, is in keeping with 
the literature (e.g., Mayo and Marks 1990, Singhapakdi et al. 1996, Singhapakdi and 
Vitell 1990) and appropriate to the nature of scenario testing; that is, because the 
respondent was answering questions based on a projective technique, the only logical way
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to capture intention was to ask whether the respondent’s intent would accord with the 
marketer’s intent in the scenario.
Pretesting
Fifteen individuals pretested the questionnaire. They were MBA students, who 
should represent similar demographics to the survey respondents. Because o f  weight 
constraints in mailing costs, the pretest questionnaire contained only two scenarios (one 
from Sparks and Hunt 1998 [adapted] and one from DomofFand Tankersley 1975). After 
each ethical judgement item there were several blank lines, on which respondents were to 
indicate why they thought each of the two behaviors was unethical. The intent was to 
capture some subjective evaluation and then be able to compare their initial reaction, 
described in their own words, to their reactions to the deontological and teleological items 
that followed. The response was disappointing; of the thirty answers, only three or four 
could be categorized as deontological or teleological. Responses tended to be 
recommendations about what to do, as in this response to the market researcher scenario: 
“He should represent the original result whether it matches the expectations or not.” In 
many other cases the respondents simply summarized the action from the scenario: “He 
was notified of the transmission failure to operate correctly and failed to fix it properly.”
As a result, the final questionnaire contained the three scenarios, as originally 
planned. None of the individuals who participated in the pretest had any difficulty 
understanding the directions for completing the deontological and teleological items. 
When asked to describe the experience of completing the questionnaire in one word, they
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responded that it was “painless1' and “easy”. They found nothing confusing or unclear, 
though one person thought the Likert scale should have been fewer than seven items. 
Participants required between eight and twenty minutes to complete the survey, which 
time should be markedly shorter without the subjective items. They were also asked 
whether they sensed any expectations, created by the language o f the questionnaire, in an 
attempt to assess social desirability bias. They responded that they felt no such pressure.
As expected (because many individuals relate more to this scenario), pretest 
respondents felt the warranty scenario was a more serious ethical matter than the market 
researcher's dilemma. There was, however, a fairly wide variance in their responses to the 
deontological and teleological items. For example, responses to the deontological item, 
“The analyst’s action is wrong because it involves lying,” ranged from 0 to 100. 
Responses to a teleological item from the second scenario, “The dealer's action is wrong 
because he has probably lost a customer, and maybe others, through negative word-of- 
mouth,” ranged from 10 to 100. All in all, pretest results seemed encouraging.
Sampling Frame and Questionnaire Mailing
The American Marketing Association (AMA) polls individual members to 
determine their major fields o f interest from a choice o f eight: agri-business, business, 
consumer, education, health care, international, marketing research, and service. This 
dissertation survey was directed to 1508 randomly selected AMA members from seven of 
the eight categories, education excluded. All addresses were within the United States, 
though many certainly represent businesses with international operations. The AMA’s
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Directors o f Marketing Divisions approved the questionnaire for this distribution, and 
Mail Marketing Inc., the company that manages the AMA membership mailing list, 
provided the mailing labels, with the proviso that they be used only once and not copied 
for any purpose. A number o f the labels were determined unusable, because the addresses 
were at universities and colleges. This was an unavoidable problem, as academics had 
specified areas o f “interest”, rather than the type of marketing activity in which they were 
involved.
The surveys were printed on two 1 l"xl7" sheets o f buff-colored paper, folded and 
saddle-stapled as a booklet. The cover page was a letter on official Old Dominion 
University letterhead, addressed to “Fellow AMA Member” and signed by the researcher 
and dissertation director. The letter was crafted carefully to accomplish several purposes:
• Describe the project in such a way as to explain why the respondent was selected
• Define why their participation is important to the research
• Explain how to fill out the questionnaire and how much time it should require
• Guarantee anonymity
• Establish credibility' o f  the project
• Express gratitude for their support in the work
The back of the cover letter was blank, and the six-page questionnaire followed. The last 
line on the back page offered thanks for the respondent’s helpfulness. A sample of the 
cover letter and survey is included in the Appendix. Included in the mailing were a self-
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addressed, prepaid business reply envelope and two brightly colored diskette labels 
intended as an incentive gift. The cover letter, on official letterhead, the two signatures, 
and the professional style of the questionnaire itself were meant to help establish 
credibility o f the research.
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Chapter IV  
Results
This chapter contains a  complete discussion of the findings from the survey of 
AMA practitioner members. It begins with a discussion o f  response rates and profiles o f 
the respondents, then moves to the results of statistical analysis, summarizing important 
descriptive statistics. The chapter concludes with an examination of each of the research 
hypotheses.
Response Rate
The questionnaires were mailed to 1508 randomly selected practitioner members 
of the AMA in mid-November, 1998. The last responses were received and entered in 
mid-January, 1999. O f the 1508 packets mailed, five were returned as undeliverable and 
325 people returned responses, for a total response rate o f 21.6%. This rate is consistent 
with other recent ethics research that involved questionnaires directed to an AMA sample 
(e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 1996 [23%], Singhapakdi et al. 1995 [22.7%]). All of the 
returned data was analyzed, though a number of respondents chose not to answer certain 
o f the questions. This issue will be more fully addressed in the section entitled “Missing 
Data.”
Nonresponse Bias
Though the response rate of 21.6% is adequate, it is important to try to determine 
whether nonrespondents might have replied differently. Therefore, the “extrapolation” 
technique of Armstrong and Overton (1977), who showed that late respondents were like
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nonrespondents, was used to compare means between early and late respondents. An 
analysis o f variance (ANOVA) between the two groups on a number o f variables 
(income, ethical judgment [EJ] in Situation 1, perceived ethical problem [PEP] in 
Situation 2, sex, and a composite of the eight religiousness items) revealed significant 
differences between the two groups on only the religiousness composite, consistent with 
interpretation as a “chance” result. The following table summarizes the results o f the 
individual T-tests.
Table 4-1. T-Tests of Early vs. Late Respondents
Variable P-Value
Income 0.85
Ethical Judgment (Situation I) 0.25
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Profile o f Respondents
The responses to the demographic information requested in the questionnaire are 
detailed in Table 4-2, starting on page 63. The variables of interest were: sex, primary job 
function, age, years o f formal education completed, religion, type of undergraduate 
education and income. All information is reported in percentages, to facilitate 
interpretation.
Slightly more than half the respondents (52.3%) were men. The average age of 
respondents was 40 and income was fairly evenly distributed between four of the five 
income categories listed. The income categories were purposely wide, to encourage 
people to answer, though this is notoriously sensitive information.1 It is perhaps 
noteworthy that only five respondents failed to record a response, compared to seven who 
left the “Nature of Education” question unanswered and two who failed to list a religion. 
All respondents answered the item about sex, but five left the “Years of Formal 
Education” item blank. In sum, it appears that the income categories elicited as many 
responses as did the majority o f the demographic items. Income was spread quite evenly 
between four of the five categories.
The item that caused the most consternation for respondents was “Primary Job 
Function;” 24 people either left this item blank or wrote in a job function that was not 
included on the list. Those “penciled-in” responses indicated that future questionnaires 
should include at least three further categories: Product Manager, Marketing Manager, 
and Other. Four categories elicited responses of 1% and less (Packing/Point of Purchase,
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Distribution/Pricing, Merchandising/Retailing, and Telemarketing), while Marketing 
Communications professionals accounted for one quarter (24.6%) of the sample and 
Marketing Researchers for almost half (44.9%).
The “Nature o f Undergraduate Education” item yielded somewhat surprising 
results, given that one might expect the majority o f respondents to have been business 
majors in college. They were, in fact, the largest group o f respondents (42.8%), but 
liberal arts majors were not far behind (41.5%). A number of people in the “Other” 
category indicated that they had majored in engineering. It is interesting to note that, 
especially in a sample so laden with marketing researchers, so few (8.8%) had a sciences 
background.
Though the nature o f the respondents’ educational backgrounds might seem 
somewhat surprising, the number of years they have devoted to formal education is as 
expected. Forty-five percent reported 16—17 years o f formal education (meaning 
generally that they have completed Bachelor’s degrees and/or started graduate study), 
while 37.5% reported 18—19 years (consistent with completing a Master’s degree).
Finally, the sample is heavily Christian (71.2%), with (not surprisingly) no 
Buddhist, Confucian or Muslim respondents at all. A small number were Hindu (0.9%) 
and more were Jewish (11.1%), while the rest characterized their religion as “Other” 
(6.6%)2 or “None” (10.2%). It is interesting to note that only two respondents failed to 
provide an answer in this category.
1 Converse and P resser (1986 , p . 61) write that these questions are generally placed at the end o f  the 
questionnaire, reflecting  “th e  sensitiv ity  o f  incom e questions, which are the most vu lnerab le to refusal."
2 T hese included m em bers o f  the C hurch o f  Latter-D ay S aints (com m only known as M orm ons) and 
Jeh o v ah ’s W itnesses.
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Years o f Formal Education Completed
15 or fewer 3.7
16-17 45.0
18-19 37.5
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Profile o f  Respondents (continued)
Variables Percentage










$ 100,000 or more 28.8
Missing Data
The decision about how to treat missing data was complicated by the fact that the 
questionnaire instructed certain respondents to leave portions of it blank. If the 
respondent perceived the action described in the scenario as completely ethical (value of 
1 on the scale) they were not to answer the deontological and teleological items, which 
described the action as “wrong” or “unethical.” Respondents were also free, in comparing 
the importance of those items, to assign one or more o f them a value of “0”, meaning the 
reason was completely unimportant to them in arriving at an ethical judgment. A blank 
and a zero, therefore, represented different reactions on those items. For all the remaining 
variables, missing data was replaced with mode values (consistent with Vitell 1986). The 
one exception was the religiousness composite variable where multiple modes existed, so 
the four blanks in this column were replaced with means.
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Manipulation Check
Some of the key responses on the questionnaire were related to the three 
scenarios. It was, therefore, necessary to determine whether the scenarios were generally 
perceived by the respondents as having ethical dimensions. The perceived ethical 
problem items are appropriate for this purpose, because they directly measure whether 
each scenario “involves an ethical problem.” This is also, as detailed earlier, considered 
by Hunt and Vitell (1986) as the “triggering mechanism” o f the entire model. As 
described earlier, these statements were measured using a Likert-type format, ranging 
from l=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. The results reveal the mean scores of 5.54, 
5.53, and 5.14 in Situations 1, 2, and 3, respectively. All three are significantly higher 
(p< .05) than the neutral level (i.e., Ho: M < 4). Specifically, there were only 5 
respondents who strongly disagreed that Situation 1 involved an ethical problem, 18 for 
Situation 2, and 5 for Situation 3. Therefore, the vast majority of respondents did indeed 
perceive the scenarios as having problematic ethical content.
Variable Development
A number of the variables (PEP, EJ, El) in this study were measured by single 
items, though, according to Churchill (1979, p. 66) “marketers are much better served 
with multi-item than single-item measures o f their constructs, and they should take the 
time to develop them.” Nonetheless, these measurements have been used a number of 
times in previous studies (as detailed in Chapter 3), and no researcher has been able, thus 
far, to propose a better way to measure them, at least in the context o f these scenarios. 
They are purposefully simple, in that they describe a single ethical issue and the resulting
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action. This format allows the researcher to use several scenarios in one instrument; as 
Vitell and Hunt (1990, p. 242) noted: “For simple scenarios where respondents need only 
indicate whether some practice is ethical or unethical, several scenarios can be used in 
one research instrument, but with more complex scenarios.. .only one per questionnaire 
appears feasible.” With only one issue and a pre-determined action in each scenario (that 
is, the responses are constrained), judgment and intention are unidimensional: How 
ethical was the action? Would you have behaved in the same way? The researcher has 
argued earlier that perception is always unidimensional. One either sees (at least to the 
extent that one would call it “seeing”) or does not; the process o f ethical decision making 
is either triggered or it is not.
O f the multi-item measures, Corporate Ethical Values (CEV) and Relativism have 
been used previously. Principal Axis Factor analysis on the CEV scale, using the data 
collected for this study, did indeed reveal a single factor that explained 52.2% of the 
sample variance. The same analysis of the Relativism items also revealed one factor, 
accounting for 44.4% o f the variance. This research, therefore, adds further confirmation 
of the validity o f these two instruments. The other multi-item measures were developed 
specifically for this dissertation, and the remaining part of this section will discuss their 
development.
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Religiousness
The religiousness construct was operationalized through eight statements that 
were originally intended for two purposes: first, to develop a reliable, valid, and 
appropriate measure o f religiousness for marketing research, and second, to find a 
measure that would be reliable across a number o f religions. As discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3, previous measures of religiousness were problematic. Though the Allport 
“Religious Orientation Scale” has been frequently used, the point of the scale is to 
differentiate between intrinsics (“having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to 
internalize it and follow it fully” [Allport 1967, p. 434]) and extrinsics (who “use religion 
to their own ends” [Allport 1967, p. 434]). It is difficult to imagine any research in 
marketing that would need this distinction; only religiousness that results in behavior is 
o f interest in marketing, and only intrinsics translate their religiousness into behavior.
The intrinsic items on the scale have also been shown to lack internal consistency and to 
be o f questionable value for other than Christian religions (e.g., Genia 1993). One item, 
for example, is: “If I were to join a religious group I would prefer to join (1) a Bible study 
group or (2) a social fellowship.”
The other scale that has been used a few times in marketing research is that of 
Wilkes, Burnett, and Howell (1986). It has the advantage of being concise (3-4 items), 
but has never shown very adequate reliability (e.g., a  = .67 in Singhapakdi et al. 1999), 
because of low inter-item correlations. The scale used in this research (Marta 1998) 
performed markedly better in the pretest, with a reliability o f a  = .91. The eight items are 
listed in Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3. Religiousness Items
Religl Spirituality is a key to living a happy life.
Relig2 I feel responsible, because of religious values, to help people who are less 
fortunate than I am.
Relig3 I feel it is important to worship regularly.
Relig4 Religious faith makes life an exciting and challenging journey.
Relig5 My religious beliefs help me to accept other people as they are.
Relig6 My religion gives focus and direction to my life.
Relig7 It is vital to support religious organizations financially.
Relig8 My religious faith convinces me that it is better to focus on others than on 
myself.
The data from the sample were appropriate for factoring (KMO = .93) and the 
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) method, with varimax rotation, was used for the analysis. 
Sharma (1996) writes “the PAF technique assumes an implicit underlying factor model. 
For this reason many researchers choose to use PAF” (p. 108), though he also notes that 
there is usually little difference between the results o f  PAF and Principal Components 
Analysis. Varimax rotation was employed in order to improve interpretability of the 
factors. As Sharma (1996) notes: “In the varimax rotation the major objective is to have a 
factor structure in which each variable loads highly on one and only one factor” (p. 119). 
Reliability, which will be discussed thoroughly in the section on Reliability and Validity 
Assessments, was excellent (a  = .95).
Table 4-4 presents the results of the factor analysis on the eight religiousness 
items. All items, based on the AMA sample, loaded on a single factor, with the lowest
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factor loading greater than .70. The eight items accounted for 69.8% o f the sample 
variance. No item, therefore, needed to be deleted for further analysis; the scale can be 
interpreted as a composite measure of the construct “religiousness.”
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Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
The deontological and teleological evaluation items were specific to each 
situation, to facilitate comparison between the two types o f moral reasoning. The 
deontological items were quite short, succinct statements that related to the specific 
behavior described in each scenario. In his response to Mayo and Marks (1990), Hunt 
asked “How should future researchers attempt to measure deontological norms? The 
theory suggests that researchers should focus on specific behavior or actions that are 
related to a particular alternative and are inherently right or wrong irrespective of any 
particular set of consequences” (Hunt 1990, p. 176). This researcher found it more useful 
to stay with short statements, which reduced the risk of introducing any references to 
consequences. The nine deontological evaluation items are presented in Table 4-5.
Table 4-5. Deontological Evaluation Items
Situation 1 The analyst’s action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of
his research.
The analyst’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent.
The analyst’s action is unethical because it involves lying.
Situation 2 The dealer’s action is wrong because it is manipulative.
The dealer’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent.
The dealer’s action is unethical because it involves lying.
Situation 3 The owner’s action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of the
business.
The owner’s action is wrong because it condones fraud.
The owner’s action is unethical because it allows multiple lies to 
customers.
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The teleological evaluation items are representative o f the numerous negative 
consequences of the three unethical behaviors described in the scenarios. Again, the 
effort was to make them specific to the particular situation and familiar to most 
marketers. Pretesting revealed no difficulties in interpretation o f either the deontological 
or teleological evaluation items. Following are the nine teleological evaluation 
statements.
Table 4-6. Teleological Evaluation Items
Situation I The analyst’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the 
company a lot o f money.
The analyst’s action is wrong because his supervisor might be blamed 
for his dishonest behavior.
The analyst’s action is wrong because his company could lose the 
account because of his unethical behavior.
Situation 2 The dealer’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the
company a lot o f money, if the car owner chooses to sue or even report 
the case to the local news media.
The dealer’s action is unethical because it reflects negatively, not only 
on his own dealership, but also on the manufacturer.
The dealer’s action is wrong because he has probably lost a customer, 
and maybe others, through negative word-of-mouth.
Situation 3 The owner’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the
company a lot o f money, through negative word-of-mouth.
The owner’s action is wrong because the whole company might develop 
a reputation for deceiving customers.
The owner’s action is wrong because his company might end up losing 
business because of the salesperson’s exaggerations.
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Principal Components Analysis, specifying two factors, was used to examine 
these items, because o f the strong theoretical background supporting the division of 
moral reasoning into duty-based (deontological) and consequentialist (teleological) 
elements. The resulting factor loadings are presented in Table 4-7.
Table 4-7. Principal Components Analysis: Deontological and Teleological Evaluation 
Items
Items Factor 1 Factor 2
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Table 4-7 (continued)






The six items related to situation 1 accounted for 61.7% of the sample variance, in 
situation 2 for 65.1%, and in situation 3 for 68.6%. One notes immediately that the 
division into two factors is very strong and clean in situation 2 and for all the teleological 
items. The only items that did not load well were the first deontological items in 
situations 1 and 3. Both had intentionally similar wording, referring to compromising the 
integrity o f the work/business. Because of these factor results, and improved reliability 
without the items (described later in this section), these two items were eliminated from 
further analysis. Then, for the sake of consistency, the first deontological evaluation item 
in situation 2 was eliminated. Though its factor loading was entirely acceptable (.64624), 
it was substantially lower than the other two deontological items in the scenario (.81624, 
.78945). As a further check, reliability analyses were carried out with two- and three-item 
measures for the second scenario and was found actually to be improved with two items 
(a  = .65) over three (a  = .61).
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Descriptive Statistics
This section provides a summary of statistics that are relevant to the variables 
measured in this study. It includes summary tables of the composite and single-item 
measures used in the questionnaire. The Corporate Ethical Values (CEV) and Relativism 
scales are “off the shelf’ and the Religiousness, Deontological and Teleological 
Evaluation scales are part of the potential contribution of this research.






[1] + [ 2 ] +  3 + 4  + 5 p. 1
Relativism 6 + 7 + 8 + 9  + 10 pp. 1-2
Religiousness 11 + 12+13 + 14+15 + 1 6 + 1 7 + 1 8 p. 2
Perceived Ethical 
Problem
19 (Situation 1), 28 (Situation 2), and 37 
(Situation 3)
pp. 2, 4, and 5
Ethical Judgment 20 (Situation 1), 29 (Situation 2), and 38 
(Situation 3)
pp. 3, 4, and 5
Deontological
Evaluation
23 + 26 (Situation 1), 32 + 35 (Situation 2), and 
4 1 + 4 4  (Situation 3)
pp. 3, 4, and 5
Teleological
Evaluation
21 + 24  + 25 (Situation 1), 30 + 33 + 34 
(Situation 2), and 39 + 42 + 43 (Situation 3)
pp. 3, 4, and 5
Ethical Intention 27 (Situation I), 36 (Situation 2), and 45 
(Situation 3)
pp. 3, 4, and 5
* The numbers indicate the question numbers on the questionnaire. Items in brackets are 
reverse scored.
Table 4-9 contains a summary, by way of review, o f the wording o f the single- 
item measures. The questionnaire was framed such that high scores indicate strong
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ethical values; that is, respondents who answer at the high end o f the scale strongly agree 
that there is an ethical problem in the scenario, judge the action to be very unethical, and 
consider themselves very unlikely to behave in the unethical manner described.
Table 4-9. Summary of Single-Item Measures
Perceived Ethical Problem The action described above involves an ethical problem.
Ethical Judgment Please rate the [marketer’s] action as to how ethical you
believe it was.
Ethical Intention I would behave as the [marketer] did in the same situation.
Two tables (4-10 and 4-11) follow, the first a summary o f descriptive statistics 
and the second a correlation matrix. The descriptive statistics include means, standard 
deviations, minimum and maximum values, and the number o f valid cases.
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Table 4-10. Descriptive Statistics




CEV 7 35 27.72 6.15 325
Relativism 5 35 13.84 6.35 325
Religiousness 8 56 34.54 13.16 325
Situation 1— PEP 1 7 5.55 1.50 325
Deon 0 200 164.15 45.64 302
Teleo 0 297 132.28 83.55 299
EJ 0 7 5.07 1.53 325
El 1 7 5.86 1.49 324
Situation 2— PEP 1 7 5.53 1.80 324
Deon 2 200 146.85 54.23 284
Teleo 0 300 160.15 86.11 286
EJ 1 7 5.68 1.46 324
El 1 7 5.79 1.51 325
Situation 3— PEP 1 7 5.14 1.49 325
Deon 0 200 155.83 51.89 306
Teleo 0 297 164.10 87.44 303
EJ 1 7 5.06 1.39 324
El 1 7 5.79 1.51 325
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Table 4-11. Correlation Matrix
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Reliability and Validity Assessments
Churchill’s (1979, p. 66) “procedure for developing better measures” includes 
assessing reliability and validity as steps six and seven of an eight-step process (the last 
step is developing norms). He writes, “a measure is reliable to the extent that independent 
but comparable measures of the same trait of construct of a given object agree” (p. 65, 
italics in original). Kerlinger (1986) puts it more simply: “Reliability is the accuracy or 
precision o f a measuring instrument” (p. 405, italics in original). The test for reliability 
most commonly used is coefficient alpha; in fact, Churchill maintains that “coefficient 
alpha absolutely should be the first measure one calculates to assess the quality of the 
instrument” (1979, p. 68, italics in original).
The commonly quoted standard for what is “high enough” comes from Nunnally 
(1967), who suggested that reliabilities o f .50 to .60 were sufficient for the introductory 
stages o f research and that increasing reliability beyond .80 was generally wasteful 
(because reliability can usually be increased by adding items). By these standards, all the 
scales used in this research were acceptable. Reliability analysis of the five Corporate 
Ethical Values items resulted in a  = .84, almost exactly equal to its reported reliabilities 
from previous studies (reported in Chapter 3). The five-item Relativism scale had a 
reliability of a  = .79, which, though slightly lower than the a  = .87 from its previous use 
(also reported in Chapter 3), is certainly well within the acceptable range.
Of the new scales tested in this research, the eight-item Religiousness scale was 
found to be even more reliable (a  = .95) than in its initial test, based on very high 
intercorrelations, as indicated in Table 4-12.
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Table 4-12. Intercorrelations Among Religiousness Items
Religl Relig2 Relig3 Relig4 Relig5 Relig 6 Relig7 Relig8
Religl 1.00
Relig2 .65 1.00
Relig3 .64 .72 1.00
Relig4 .66 .73 .86
Relig5 .57 .68 .68
Relig6 .62 .71 .78
Relig7 .55 .68 .82




.76 .66 .74 1.00
.64 .71 .67 .68
The deontological and teleological evaluation items also performed relatively well 
in reliability analysis, as outlined in the table. The teleological items resulted in higher 
reliabilities, but there were also three for each scenario, as opposed to two of the 
deontological evaluation items. Given that there were only two deontological items for 
each scenario, the resulting reliabilities are quite acceptable, as shown in Table 4-13.
Validity can be defined as “measuring what we think we are measuring”
(Kerlinger 1986, p. 417). There are three types of validity that a researcher should 
examine, of which one is o f predominant importance:
The most important classification of types of validity is that prepared by a 
joint committee o f the American Psychological Association, the American 
Educational Research Association, and the National Council on 
Measurements Used in Education. Three types o f validity are discussed: 
content, criterion-related, and construct. Each o f these will be examined 
briefly, though we put the greatest emphasis on construct validity, since it 
is probably the most important form of validity from the scientific 
research point o f view (Kerlinger 1986, p. 417, italics in original).
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Content validity describes the extent to which the universe of content of the topic 
is represented by the measuring instrument. Churchill writes “If the sample is appropriate 
and the items ‘look right,’ the measure is said to have face  or content validity (Churchill 
1979, p. 69, italics in original). Criterion-related validity relates to the ability of the 
instrument to predict outcomes. Construct validity is the most important; in fact, 
according to Kerlinger it “is one of the most significant scientific advances of modem 
measurement theory and practice. It is a significant advance because it links 
psychometric notions and practices to theoretical notions” (1986, p. 420). The link 
between measurement and theory occurs because seeking to establish construct validity 
propels researchers beyond whether a measurement works (e.g., does it predict 
outcomes?) to why it works. The results o f the measurement must conform to established 
theory, or their construct validity is questionable.
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Reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for construct validity. 
Beyond establishing reliability, then, “the analyst also must determine (1) the extent to 
which the measure correlates with other measures designed to measure the same thing 
and (2) whether the measure behaves as expected” (Churchill 1979, p. 70). The off-the- 
shelf scales used in this research (CEV and Relativism) have been demonstrated in 
previous research to be valid. For example, the Relativism scale revealed the expected 
negative relationship between relativism and ethical sensitivity in two different studies 
(Sparks and Hunt 1998; Shaub 1989). CEV correlated positively with job commitment in 
one study (Hunt, Wood and Chonko 1989) and with perceptions about the importance of 
ethics and social responsibility in achieving organizational effectiveness (Singhapakdi et 
al. 1995).
In addition to the two previously used scales, a number of the constructs from the 
Hunt-Vitell model have been extensively researched, as described in Chapter 2. Validity 
checks on PEP, Ethical Judgment, and Ethical Intention, therefore, will not be repeated 
here. The remaining part of this section will be devoted to assessing the validity of the 
Religiousness, Deontological Evaluation, and Teleological Evaluation measures.
Criterion-Related Validity
In order to assess this type of validity, it is necessary to compare scale scores with 
an external criterion. As Kerlinger (1986, p. 419) observes: “The single greatest difficulty 
of criterion-related validation is the criterion. Obtaining criteria may even be difficult.” In 
this case, it is most helpful to compare correlations. The eight Religiousness items
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correlate negatively with the five Relativism items, which suggests validity.
Religiousness also correlates positively with the Deontological items; Relativism with the 
Teleological items. These correlations will be discussed fully in the section on 
Hypothesis Testing.
Construct Validity
Churchill (1979) recommends reliability assessment as the necessary first step 
toward establishing construct validity. This testifies that the scale items are internally 
consistent. Then, as noted earlier, the researcher needs to examine how the scale 
correlates with other measures that are designed to evaluate the same construct, and 
whether the results are relatively consistent with expectations. Carmines and Zeller 
(1979) describe construct validation as involving three distinct steps:
First, the theoretical relationship between the concepts themselves must be 
specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the measures o f the 
concepts must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be 
interpreted in terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the 
particular measure (p. 23).
The main point in construct validation, therefore, is that the theoretical basis must 
be quite strong, or one can become involved with a series o f compounding errors, thereby 
introducing bias. The stress throughout the rest o f  this section will be on establishing the 
theoretical basis for the new measures. The Deontological Evaluation measures used in 
this study condemn two actions as wrong: lying and fraud. Both would be classified as 
prima facie rules; that is, rules that are generally considered to be binding. According to
80
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De George, “Do not lie” is a prima facie rule (1990, p. 74).3 Fraud is synonymous with 
deceit; both are forms o f lies. It may be that the deleted deontological evaluation items, 
referring to manipulation and compromised integrity, failed to correlate strongly because 
they are perceived as not relating directly to lies and fraud.
The Teleological Evaluation items are all clearly results of unethical behavior, but 
they are good examples o f the problems of establishing content validity in this type of 
research; that is, they certainly do not cover the universe o f content, because of the nature 
o f the construct. One o f the problems with consequentialist ethics is that acts have many 
consequences, of varying seriousness. It is impossible to specify all of them precisely; De 
George (1990, p. 48) writes, “We cannot know all the consequences of a particular act, 
nor can we know in advance, and with certainty, many of the specific consequences of 
such an act.” The teleological evaluation items used for this research, therefore, are a 
sample of possible, even probable, results of unethical behavior, related to each other by 
being logical outcomes o f the scenarios. These include: costing the company money, 
someone else being blamed, and losing business or reputation.
The universe o f content of the religiousness construct has proved very difficult for 
scholars (in any field o f study) to delineate. De Jong, Faulkner and Warland (1976) listed 
twelve studies that discovered between three and ten dimensions in religiousness. The 
Allport (1967) “Religious Orientation Scale” found two dimensions (intrinsic and 
extrinsic), but further studies that analyzed independent data sets have “suggested that 
extrinsic religiousness consists of two distinct components” (Genia 1993, p. 284). In
3 Lying and fraud both v iolate the ninth com m andm ent, w hich p roh ib its  g iv ing false testim ony against your 
neighbor (Exodus 20: 16). Surely  th is counts as corroboration ( o f  conten t validity) from an Expen.
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terms of construct validity, however, the Marta (1998) scale has points of congruence 
with much of the previous work. For example, four of the eight items (“My religion gives 
focus and direction to my life,” “Religious faith makes life an exciting and challenging 
journey,” “My religion gives focus and direction to my life,” and “Spirituality is a key to 
living a happy life.”) refer to the positive effect on psychological well-being that many 
theorists have described. Wiebe and Fleck (1980, p. 181) write:
Such diverse theorists as Allport, Frankl, and Jung suggest religion may 
have a positive effect on psychological well-being by forming a basis of 
integration for the different facets of life, thereby providing meaning and 
initiating greater emotional stability.
Most previous scales also contained an item measuring frequency of church/worship 
attendance. The current scale preserves this item, with a small modification. A 
psychometric evaluation of the Allport scale (Genia 1993) noted that, although they 
found correlation between worship attendance and intrinsic religiousness in all except 
Unitarians, there are theoretical problems with the measurement. She concluded that “it 
seems more appropriate to treat intrinsic faith and participation in religious services as 
separate variables” (Genia 1993, p. 287). The modification in the current wording (“I feel 
it is important to worship regularly”) attempts to have the best of both worlds, measuring 
not worship attendance per se, but conviction about the value of worship.
Other items stress an orientation toward other people (“I feel responsible, because 
of religious values, to help people who are less fortunate than I am,” “My religious 
beliefs help me to accept other people as they are,” “My religious faith convinces me that 
it is better to focus on others than on myself.”). These are consistent with Friedrichs
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(1960), who found positive correlations between belief in God and self-reported 
charitable actions, and Batson et al. (1989), who cite self-reports that “suggest a strong 
desire on the part of the more devout to show greater concern and compassion” (p. 873).
The remaining item is interesting because it is the only one that was generated 
originally by the author— “It is vital to support religious organizations financially.” Its 
highest correlations are with the items about worship attendance, faith as an exciting and 
challenging journey, and religiousness giving focus and direction to life. The item is 
logically satisfying because we generally “put our money where our mouth is”; that is, 
we pay for what we value. To summarize, then, correlations and consistency with the 
work of previous scholars, along with acceptable reliabilities, testify to the construct 
validity of the Religiousness and Deontological/Teleological Evaluation scales.
Hypothesis Testing
The seventeen hypotheses proposed at the end of Chapter 2 will be evaluated in 
the remaining subsections of this chapter, using structural equation modeling through the 
LISREL 8.12a program. The analysis specifications were consistent with Singhapakdi, 
Vitell and Franke (1999), whose model also included religiousness, corporate ethical 
values, and relativism. Specifically, the multi-item measures were summed to reduce 
model complexity and their error terms fixed at 1 minus the Cronbach’s alpha value for 
the scale. Error terms for the single-item measures (PEP, EJ and El) were set at 0.20. 
Singhapakdi, Vitell and Franke (1999, p. 27) explain their choice o f 0.20 as somewhat 
arbitrary, “but it is comparable to the median reliability across thousands of measures 
analyzed by Peterson (1994), and it is somewhat more conservative than the equally
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arbitrary value of .85 used by Joreskog and Sorbom (1982).’’ The goodness-of-flt 
statistics and analysis results are presented in Tables 4-14 and 4-15. The path diagrams of 
all three situations follow the tables, in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.
Table 4-14. Goodness o f Fit Statistics
Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3
Chi-Square (10 d.f.) 26.45 18.61 23.14
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.98 0.99 0.98
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0.93 0.95 0.94
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.032 0.026 0.038
The goodness o f fit statistics, taken together, reveal a very good fit. According to 
Hair, et al. (1998, p. 653), this assessment requires a number of separate tests: 
“Researchers have developed a number o f goodness-of-flt measures that, when used in 
combination, assess the results from three perspectives: overall fit, comparative fit to a 
base model, and model parsimony.” The chi-square test is considered the most 
fundamental, in the sense that it is the only measure with an associated statistical test of 
significance. When adjusted for degrees of freedom, it becomes a measure o f 
parsimonious fit (Hair et al. 1998, p. 658). The p-value should be nonsignificant, 
meaning that the observed and estimated matrices differ considerably. Hair, et al. (1998, 
p. 654) write that “The .05 significance level is recommended as the minimum accepted, 
and levels of .1 or .2 should be exceeded before nonsignificance is confirmed.” As Table 
4-14 shows, the significance levels of the three models meet this criterion (.26, .19, and 
.23).
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The most important criticism o f the chi-square test has been that it is too sensitive 
to sample size. Hair, et al. (1998. p. 655), report that studies have shown the chi-square 
functions best on samples o f between 100 and 200. The test is, therefore, suspect on this 
sample of 325. The other measures, however, confirm the good fit. The GFI (Goodness- 
of-Fit Index) is an overall measure; values closer to 1, as in this model (.98, .99, .98) 
indicate good fit. The AGFI (Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index) is an incremental fit 
measure; in other words, it compares the proposed model to the null model. Hair, et al. 
(1998, p. 657), recommend that the level for this test should be greater than or equal to 
.90. Again, the model fits well (.93, .95, .94). Finally, Hair, et al. (1998, p. 659), 
recommend evaluating RMR values, which are averages o f residuals between observed 
and estimated input matrices. These should be low, as they are in these three models 
(.032, .026, .038). All measures, therefore, indicate good fit.
Table 4-15. LISREL Analysis Results
Relationship Tested Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3
Relig—>PEP .043 .045 .16
(.66) (.69) (2.40)**
Relat-»PEP -.079 -.054 -.10
(-1.07) (-.72) (-1.42)
CEV—>PEP .22 -.014 .17
(3.12)** (-.21) (2.41)**
Relig—>Deon .13 .12 .12
(2.00)** (1.63) (1.65)*
CEV-»Deon -.006 -.12 -.038
(-.08) (-1.56) (-.51)
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Table 4-15. LISREL Analysis Results (continued)
Relationship Tested Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3
Relat-^Deon .028 -.017 .17
(.38) (-.21) (2.06)**
Relig-»Teleo .042 .067 .018
(.63) (1.01) (.27)
CEV—»Teleo .007 -.008 -.049
(.10) (-.11) (-.70)
Relat->Teleo .079 .13 .14
(1.01) (1.73)* (1.97)**
PEP->Deon .49 .34 .44
(5.88)** (4.26)** (5.20)**
PEP-»Teleo .013 -.082 .021
(.17) (-1.19) (.30)
PEP->EJ .58 .77 .65
(7.04)** (6.90)** (7.49)**
Deon-»EJ .32 .22 .22
(4.28)** (3.33)** (2.99)**
TeIeo-»EJ .038 .15 -.033
(.72) (2.84)** (-.64)
EJ-»EI .80 .62 .64
(7.48)** (6.32)** (7.45)**
U pper values are m easurem ent coefficients; t statistics are show n in parentheses.
* P < . I  * *  P<.05
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Figure 4-3. Path Diagram for Situation 3
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Influences o f  Perceived Ethical Problem
The first set o f  hypotheses concern the effect o f perception of an ethical problem 
(PEP) on ethical judgment (EJ) and the deontologicai (Deon) and teleological (Teleo) 
evaluations. Hypothesis la  states that marketers who perceive an ethical problem will be 
more likely to form an ethical judgment. As Table 4-15 indicates, this hypothesis is 
supported. There is a strong relationship between PEP and EJ, as hypothesized, in each of 
the three situations (standardized coefficients o f .58, .77 and .65, respectively, in 
Situations 1, 2 and 3) described on the questionnaire. Hypothesis lb states that marketers 
who perceive an ethical problem are more likely to make a deontologicai evaluation. This 
hypothesis is also supported by strong relationships between PEP and Deon (coefficients 
o f .49, .34, .44) in all situations. The last hypothesis in this section, 1 c, states that there 
will be a positive relationship between PEP and Teleo, based on the idea that marketers 
who perceive an ethical problem will make both types o f evaluations. This hypothesis is 
not supported (.013, -.082, .021). There is no evidence in any of the situations o f a 
relationship between PEP and Teleo.
Influences o f  Deontologicai and Teleological Evaluations
Hypothesis 2a posits a positive relationship between Deon and EJ; 2b a positive 
relationship between Teleo and EJ. As is clear from Table 4-15, hypothesis 2a is 
supported. There is a strong relationship between Deon and EJ (standardized coefficients: 
.32, .22, .22) in all three situations. Hypothesis 2b, however, is only weakly supported; 
there is evidence of a relationship between Teleo and EJ (.038, .15, -.033) in only one of 
the situations.
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The third hypothesis, that marketers rely more heavily on deontologicai than 
teleological evaluations when arriving at an ethical judgment, was also supported. 
Marketers rely more heavily on deontologicai than teleological evaluations when arriving 
at an ethical judgment. The relationship between Deon and EJ is significant in all three 
situations; that between Teleo and EJ in only one. The deontologicai evaluation is a 
stronger predictor of ethical judgment than the teleological evaluation.
Influence o f  Ethical Judgment
The single hypothesis regarding ethical intentions posits a positive relationship 
between it and ethical judgment; that is, marketers who form an ethical judgment will 
have more ethical intentions. As the Table 4-15 indicates, H3 is supported. There are 
strong positive relationships between EJ and El (standardized coefficients: .80, .62, .64) 
in all three situations.
Religiousness/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
The hypotheses about the relationships between religiousness (Relig) and the 
deontologicai and teleological evaluations again are posited in terms o f positive or 
negative relationships. Hypothesis 4a proposes a positive relationship between Relig and 
PEP, which is weakly supported by a positive relationship in one of the three situations 
only (standardized coefficients: .043, .045, .16). The second hypothesis asserts a positive 
relationship between Relig and Deon. The structural equation analysis (standardized 
coefficients: .13, .12, .12) indicates the relationship is significant at p < .05 in the first 
situation and at p < . 1 in the third. The /-value in the second situation is very close to that
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in the third situation (1.65 in the third and 1.63 in the second); therefore, bearing in mind 
that the analysis was specified conservatively, we can generally conclude that hypothesis 
4b is supported. Hypothesis 4c posits a negative relationship between Relig and Teleo. 
The results indicate no relationship (.042, .067, .018), however; hypothesis 4c is not 
supported.
Corporate Ethical Values/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
The three hypotheses in this group assert positive relationships between Corporate 
Ethical Values (CEV) and Perceived Ethical Problem (PEP), CEV and the Deontologicai 
Evaluation (Deon), and CEV and the Teleological Evaluation (Teleo). Hypothesis 5a 
proposes the relationship between CEV and PEP; this hypothesis is supported by two out 
o f three significant relationships (standardized coefficients: .22, -.014, .17). Hypotheses 
5b and 5c, however, are not supported. There is not a single statistically significant 
relationship between CEV and Deon or Teleo4 among all three situations.
Relativism/D eontological and Teleological Evaluations
There are four hypotheses testing the relationships between Relativism (Relat), 
PEP, Deon, and Teleo. Hypothesis 6a asserts a negative relationship between Relat and 
PEP. As the results shown in Table 4-15 indicate (standardized coefficients: -.079, -.054, 
-.10), this hypothesis is not supported. Hypothesis 6b posits a negative relationship 
between Relat and Deon, which is weakly supported by one significant relationship (.028, 
—.017, .17), in the third situation. The third hypothesis predicts a positive relationship
4 Standardized coefficients for C E V -> D eon :- .0 0 6 , - .1 2 , - .0 3 8 ; CEV —>Teleo: .0 0 7 ,- .0 0 8 ,- .0 4 9 .
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between Relat and Teleo; hypothesis 6c is supported (.079, .13, .14). The relationship in 
the third situation is significant at p < .05, and that in the second situation at p < .1. 
Hypothesis 6d states that more relativistic marketers will rely more on teleological than 
on deontologicai evaluations. This hypothesis is also supported (see again Table 4-15) by 
comparing two significant relationships between Relat and Teleo with only one between 
Relat and Deon.
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Summary o f Hypothesis Testing
The following table presents the results of all hypothesis testing, in summary
form:
Table 4-16. Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis Result
H la. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an 
ethical problem are more likely to form an ethical judgment.
Supported
H lb. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an 
ethical problem are more likely to make a deontologicai 
evaluation.
Supported
Hlc. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an 
ethical problem are more likely to make a teleological 
evaluation.
Not supported
H2a. Marketers who make a deontologicai evaluation are more 
likely to form an ethical judgment.
Supported
H2b. Marketers who make a teleological evaluation are more 
likely to form an ethical judgment. Weakly supported
H2c. Marketers rely more heavily on deontologicai than 
teleological evaluations in making ethical judgments.
Supported
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Results o f  Hypothesis Testing (continued)
Hypothesis Result
H4a. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her 
perception of an ethical problem.
Weakly supported
H4b. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her 
tendency to rely more on a deontologicai evaluation in 
making an ethical judgment.
Supported
H4c. A marketer’s religiousness is negatively related to his or her 
tendency to rely more on a teleological evaluation in making 
an ethical judgment.
Not supported
H5a. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical 
values will be more perceptive of ethical problems.
Supported
H5b. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical 
values will be more likely to rely on deontologicai 
evaluations when making an ethical judgment.
Not supported
H5c. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical 
values will be more likely to rely on teleological evaluations 
when making an ethical judgment.
Not supported
H6a. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her 
perception of an ethical problem.
Not supported
H6b. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her 
tendency to rely more on a deontologicai evaluation in 
making an ethical judgment.
Weakly supported
H6c. A marketer’s relativism is positively related to his or her 
tendency to rely more on a teleological evaluation in making 
an ethical judgment.
Supported
H6d. Relativistic marketers rely more on teleological than on 
deontologicai evaluations in making an ethical judgment.
Supported
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Chapter V 
Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation has been to provide a relatively comprehensive 
test o f one of the important positive theories of how marketers make ethical decisions, 
specifically, the Hunt-Vitell model. More precisely, the work was to test original scales to 
measure religiousness and its influence on and implications for ethical decision making, 
and to assess the relative contributions of deontologicai and teleological reasoning on 
ethical judgment. The conceptual model and research hypotheses that drove the inquiry 
evolved from the extensive literature review of positive work in marketing ethics, which 
is detailed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 proposed methodology and procedures for the work, 
the results of which are found in Chapter 4. This final chapter has five sections. The first 
reviews the results of hypothesis testing. The second describes the contribution of this 
research to the field o f marketing ethics. The third section is a discussion of the 
limitations of the research instrument and method, while the fourth contains suggestions 
for future research to extend our understanding of ethical decision making. The fifth and 
last section outlines some managerial implications deriving from the analysis.
Results of Hypothesis Testing
This research tested a relatively large number o f hypotheses; therefore, the 
discussion will be divided into results from testing on exogenous (Corporate Ethical 
Values [CEV], Relativism [Relat], and Religiousness [Relig]) and endogenous variables 
(Perceived Ethical Problem [PEP], Deontologicai [Deon] and Teleological [Teleo] 
Evaluations, Ethical Judgment [EJ], and Ethical Intentions [El]).
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Results o f  Testing on Exogenous Variables
In general, the testing on exogenous variables did not find as many significant 
results as that on the endogenous ones. This is to be expected, because o f the large 
number of potential exogenous constructs that may affect a marketer’s ethical decision 
making process. Hunt and Vitell (1993) depict 18 in their revised model, some o f which 
are very broad. These broadly sketched constructs may, in their turn, consist o f  many 
separate dimensions.
Corporate Ethical Values is one example. We would place this construct in the 
“Organizational Environment” box (see the Hunt-Vitell Model on p. 17), which has three 
bulleted items in it: informal norms, formal codes, and code enforcement. One might look 
at the CEV scale and conclude that it measures all o f those items. It asks about how often 
the respondent perceives it is necessary, in their company, to compromise his or her 
ethics—a question about informal norms. There are several items about the results of 
unethical behavior—questions about code enforcement. The CEV also includes a 
statement about top management having made it clear that unethical behavior will not be 
tolerated—this might be construed as a “formal code” item. If so, the construct is being 
measured by only one item, as is the construct “informal norms”. If indeed CEV attempts 
to measure everything contained in the “organizational environment” description, it is a 
weak attempt; it does not even ask the obvious questions about whether the respondent’s 
firm has a code of ethics or educates about it. Most likely, the CEV scale is an attempt to 
measure a subset of the exogenous variables that might exist within one’s organizational
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
environment. The exogenous variables that “feed into” the ethical decision making 
process, as depicted by Hunt-Vitell, therefore, number far more than 18.
Of the three hypotheses that tested CEV, one was supported. The connection that 
was established was between corporate ethical values and PEP (H5a). Marketers who 
work in firms with higher ethical standards are significantly more likely to perceive 
correctly that a given situation has problematic ethical content. The other two 
unsupported hypotheses proposed that marketers that worked in companies that they 
rated higher on the CEV scale would be more likely to rely on both deontologicai (H5b) 
and teleological (H5c) evaluations than those in firms that were perceived to be less 
ethical work environments. We might conclude that individuals engage in the process of 
ethical evaluation, after they have perceived the problem, irrespective o f the type of 
environment in which they work. Perhaps they may arrive at a different conclusion (or 
ethical judgment) if  they work in unethical firms, or behave less ethically if the norms 
encourage such behavior, but those questions lie beyond the scope o f this project.
Religiousness is also one of numerous exogenous variables specified in the Hunt- 
Vitell model, appearing both as a cultural and individual influence on ethical decision 
making. The religiousness scale used to measure the construct performed excellently in 
terms of reliability, but the hypothesis testing revealed mixed results. Hypothesis 4a 
posited a positive relationship between Relig and PEP; this was only weakly supported. 
Again, this is to be expected. Other exogenous variables in the Hunt-Vitell model (e.g., 
strength of moral character, belief system) may overlap with and moderate the effects of 
religiousness on perception o f an ethical problem.
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Hypothesis 4b, however, was fully supported in this research—religiousness is 
positively related to a marketer’s tendency to rely more on a deontologicai evaluation in 
making an ethical judgment. This result actually addresses two different issues raised in 
this stream of research. First is the question of the need for a religiousness scale within 
marketing research. If religiousness is related to deontologicai reasoning, we need to be 
able to measure it effectively; deontologicai evaluations are at the core o f the Hunt-Vitell 
model and, as discussed in Chapter 2, of much research in business ethics generally. 
Second, the relationship between religiousness and the measures o f Deon used in this 
research helps to demonstrate the validity o f the Deon measures. Christianity is a strongly 
deontologicai religion, and most o f the respondents in this survey were Christians. The 
Deon measures, therefore, demonstrate a logical relationship with the religiousness 
construct—testimony that they are measuring what they are intended to measure. The 
testimony to validity does not apply to the religiousness measures, however, because 
marketers who are not religious still rely on deontologicai evaluations. If such a strongly 
Christian sample did not tend to reason deontologically, because of the nature of 
Christian morality, it would be good reason to question what the religiousness scale was 
actually measuring.
The third hypothesis that tested the effect o f religiousness (H4c) proposed a 
negative relationship with Teleo. This was not supported by the data. Religiousness does 
not seem to affect whether individuals make a teleological evaluation when confronted 
with an ethical decision. This is not an intuitively unsatisfying result; Christianity (again, 
this sample population was strongly Christian) is a deontologicai belief system, but does 
not generally teach against considering the consequences of actions. Making a
99
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
teleological evaluation seems to be a very natural human activity. De George explains it 
thus: “It is reasonable for rational beings, who are able to foresee the consequences of 
their actions, to choose those actions that produce more good than those that produce less 
good, other things being equal” (1990, p. 44). If consequential evaluation is a reasonable 
action for rational beings, it would require very intensive religious training to counteract 
the impulse; American Christianity has not generally considered such training a priority 
in education or preaching.
The last exogenous construct explored in this dissertation is Relativism. The four 
hypotheses garnered mixed results. H6a was not supported; relativism has no significant 
relationship to PEP in this sample population. This is not inconsistent with previous 
research. Singhapakdi, Vitell and Franke (1999) found relativism was negatively related 
to PEP in only one o f four scenarios. The next two hypotheses posited a negative 
relationship between Relat and Deon (H6b) and a positive one between Relat and Teleo 
(H6c). Both these hypotheses were supported, though support for the first was weak. The 
negative relationship between Relat and Deon is weaker than the positive relationship 
between Relat and Teleo.
The research also documented a tendency for marketers who are highly 
relativistic to rely more on the teleological evaluation when making ethical judgments. 
Hypothesis 6d, predicting that relativistic marketers would rely more on teleological than 
deontologicai evaluations when making an ethical judgment, was supported. We can not 
conclude that highly relativistic marketers are less likely to perceive the existence of an 
ethical problem, but there is a tendency for more relativistic marketers to weigh 
consequences more heavily than deontologicai norms in their ethical evaluations.
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Results o f  Testing on Endogenous Variables
This research confirmed relationships between a number of the endogenous 
constructs represented in the Hunt-Vitell model, further corroborating their theory. Five 
o f the seven hypotheses were supported. Of the three related to PEP, the research 
confirmed a link between PEP and EJ (HIa); that is, marketers who perceive the 
existence of an ethical problem are more likely to form an ethical judgment. Those 
marketers are also significantly more likely to make a deontologicai evaluation, 
supporting Hlb. The third PEP hypothesis (Hlc) was not supported. This proposed that 
marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem are more likely 
to make a teleological evaluation. Again, as in the De George (1990) quote in the 
previous section, this may be because evaluating consequences is simply a natural and 
rational response when one is confronted with an ethical dilemma.
Also supported in this research is H31, which asserts a positive relationship 
between EJ and El; therefore, marketers who form an ethical judgment have more ethical 
intentions. As reviewed in Chapter 2, other researchers have confirmed this result through 
previous empirical work. This link is probably the best documented one in the Hunt- 
Vitell model.
Finally, at the heart o f this project has been the question of how to measure 
deontologicai and teleological evaluations and their relative weights in making ethical 
judgments. The measurement results will be discussed in the Contribution and 
Limitations sections, but the relative weights were the subject o f  one of the hypotheses in
1 Leaving the hypotheses about the relative w eights o f  Deon and Teleo for the end o f  this section. They are 
the m ost interesting to the researcher, w ho firm ly believes in “ leaving the best for last.”
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this last group. Hypothesis 2a states that marketers who make a deontologicai evaluation 
are more likely to form an ethical judgment. This hypothesis was supported. The 
corollary was only weakly supported, however; marketers who make a teleological 
evaluation are somewhat more likely to form an ethical judgment (H2b).
Based on theory and some empirical evidence, hypothesis 2c posited that the 
respondent marketers would rely more on deontologicai than on teleological evaluations 
when making ethical judgments. This issue is o f fundamental importance in all research 
streams that assess ethical decision making; certainly, the interest is not limited to 
marketing ethics. This study supported H2c, confirming that Deon was o f relatively more 
significance than Teleo for this sample of marketers.
Contribution of This Research
This work makes a number of contributions to the field of marketing ethics. First, 
it provides a comprehensive test of relationships proposed in the Hunt-Vitell model of 
ethical decision making. This “wide-angle” research included variables at every level of 
the model save the last (see the Hunt-Vitell model on p. 17)— behavior. Perception of an 
ethical problem (PEP) was found to be significantly related to ethical judgments (EJ) and 
to deontologicai evaluations (Deon). Deon was also related to EJ, and EJ, in turn, to 
ethical intentions (El). It also confirmed three relationships between exogenous and 
endogenous constructs: religiousness is positively related to Deon, Corporate Ethical 
Values (CEV) to PEP, and relativism is negatively related to Deon and positively to 
Teleo. Compared to the published articles that involve explicit tests of the model, this is 
the most comprehensive.
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The second contribution from this dissertation research is the Religiousness scale 
(Marta 1998). It had been pretested in development, and performed very well with this 
sample. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the eight items are well represented on other 
religiousness scales (testimony to their validity as measures of the construct), and, as 
detailed earlier in this chapter, they were found to be related to Deon in this research, 
which is consistent with theory.
Marketing research would benefit from a reliable and valid religiousness measure 
in a number of areas. The potential application in marketing ethics is obvious, but the 
construct has also been studied in reference to consumer behavior, in the U.S. (Wilkes, 
Bumett and Howell, 1986) and in a comparative study between the U.S. and Japan (Sood 
and Nasu 1995). This last points toward many likely applications in international 
research. Mittelstaedt (1995) proposed a number of relationships between religiousness 
and the marketplace, with special focus on the growing trade between the U.S. and 
Muslim countries. Religiousness can affect what we trade (e.g., dietary restrictions, 
insurance [which is restricted by the religious teachings of Islam]), how we trade (e.g., 
contract law), when we trade (e.g., holy days), and how consumers fee l about trade (e.g., 
attitudes about the acquisition o f wealth).
In assessing the current state o f the research, Mittelstaedt notes that micro 
approaches to the study of the relationship between religion and consumption behavior or 
market outcomes have failed for “any combination of three reasons” (1995, p. 12). First, 
it is possible that no significant differences exist that are attributable to religious reasons. 
Second, differences may exist, but appropriate measurement tools have not been 
developed. And third, the measurement tools may not have been used properly.
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Hirschman (1983), for example, used religious affiliation as an indicator of religiousness; 
however, “religious affiliation is not an appropriate measure o f religiousness” 
(Mittelstaedt 1995, p. 12). His review of the literature leads to the conclusion that the 
failure of micro approaches results from the “lack o f useful measures o f religiousness”
(p. 13). One contribution o f this dissertation is such a measure.
A third contribution addresses another measurement issue: how to determine 
whether people are processing moral questions by deontologicai or teleological means. 
Four studies have tried different types of measurement, but the Mayo and Marks (1990) 
and Akaah (1997) studies used methods that confounded Deon and Teleo. Vitell and 
Hunt (1990) found that respondents used both deontologicai and teleological reasoning, 
but their main goal was to test the relative effectiveness of reward and punishment. This 
study also had a small sample size and used only one scenario. Hunt and Vasquez- 
Parraga (1993) and Vitell and Hunt (1990) found that marketers relied more heavily on 
the deontologicai evaluation, as in the current study, pairing each deontologicai condition 
was paired with a specific result. The method used in the present research proved to be 
adequately reliable, parsimonious, effective, and straightforward. It would have been 
impossible, for example, to use the Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga method (a 2X2 
randomized design that paired different actions and results) to study relationships 
between religiousness and Deon, or PEP and Deon.
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Limitations o f Dissertation
Potential limitations of this research include nonresponse and social desirability 
bias. No evidence of bias between early and late respondents was found, based on the 
“extrapolation” technique of Armstrong and Overton (1977), who showed that late 
respondents were like nonrespondents. In terms o f social desirability bias, it is clear from 
the means of the perception of an ethical problem variable (5.55 in Situation 1, 5.53 in 
Situation 2, and 5.14 in Situation 3; neutral value was 4) that many respondents did not 
respond in a “socially desirable” way, even though the cover letter sensitized them by 
referring to the questionnaire as “part o f a national study on marketing ethics.”2 In other 
words, though respondents knew the questionnaire was about ethics, many felt quite free 
to respond that they did not perceive much of an ethical problem.
Another limitation may be the fact that Deon and Teleo were measured as 
constructs. Hunt and Vitell believe they would be better assessed as “processes,” not 
“constructs” and, therefore, “direct measures of deontologicai evaluation and teleological 
evaluation are probably inappropriate” (1993, p. 778). It is somewhat difficult to 
conceptualize how this would be done, because it is very tricky to discern precisely when 
a deontologicai evaluation begins to suggest consequences. Also, as discussed earlier, 
treating them as constructs makes it possible to assess other relationships.
Suggestions for Future Research
Future research in the area might benefit from a specific attempt to use a multitrait 
multimethod matrix to establish construct validity. For example, researchers could
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contrast results from the method used in this research with those that derive from 
randomized design research like that used by Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993).
Future ethics research would also profit enormously from an endeavor to find 
credible methods to measure behavior. Ethical intentions are usually considered weak 
predictors of ethical behavior. The deterrent is inevitably smaller sample sizes, as 
behavior would need to be measured in some type of laboratory setting.
Also, theory-testing based on the Hunt-Vitell model cannot proceed much further 
until researchers develop and test a number of new measures o f exogenous variables. For 
example, surely “strength o f moral character,” “value system,” and “belief system” affect 
a number of the endogenous constructs in the model. Also, though a number of 
researchers have worked with cognitive moral development (e.g., Trevino 1986, Goolsby 
and Hunt 1992), none has studied it in the context of this model of ethical decision 
making.
Finally, one link in the model that begs for solid empirical evidence is the second 
teleological evaluation that Hunt and Vitell posit in a direct relationship with intentions. 
In other words, the model depicts a process whereby an individual considers 
deontologicai and teleological factors, arrives at an ethical judgment, then goes for one 
more round of teleological evaluation before arriving at an ethical intention. An example 
might have the marketing researcher consider the question o f changing data by the 
following process: ‘It’s a lie, and furthermore it’s fraudulent to change this data, even 
though we might lose the account if I don’t. But if I do, and someone finds out, the 
company’s whole reputation would be shot. Anyway, I’m just not going to start lying
2 H unt and V asquez-Parraga (1993) deal w ith the question o f  social desirab ility  bias in a very sim ilar 
fashion.
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now— money’s too expensive to be earned that way. But wait! What if  my supervisor 
really follows through on that veiled threat to fire me if I lose the account? We don’t have 
enough in savings to make more than one mortgage payment without my incom e.. . ” In 
this example, everything after “but wait!” is a second, more immediate and personal 
teleological evaluation. This relationship has not, to the researcher’s knowledge, been 
tested. Such a test might also fulfill Hunt’s (1990) vision that deontologicai and 
teleological evaluations should be tested as processes, rather than constructs.
Managerial Implications
Of the seventeen hypotheses tested in this dissertation, twelve were supported3, 
with some implications for managers who are concerned with encouraging marketers 
toward more ethical business decisions. First, managers should be aware o f the 
relationships between personal religiousness and ethical variables. This research found 
weak support relating religiousness to ethical perception, strong support for the link 
between religiousness and deontologicai evaluations, and strong support for the link 
between deontologicai evaluations and ethical judgment. Managers who are concerned 
about ethics, therefore, need to strengthen deontologicai reasoning in their firms. One 
way would be to be quite clear, especially in the context of ethics training, that the firm 
does not mean for its employees to behave in ways that are inconsistent with their 
religious beliefs. They might recommend that any employee who feels such pressure 
should bring the matter to the Ethics Committee (or whatever body exists to oversee 
ethics program implementation). If indeed there is a religious revival in progress in the
3 Though in th ree cases the weak support points ou t the need for further em pirical research in those areas.
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United States, companies that intend to raise ethical standards should certainly explore 
ways to encourage the moral values that such revival will probably nourish.
On the other hand, results showed an inverse relationship between relativism and 
deontologicai evaluations and a positive link with teleological evaluations. Corporations 
that are concerned with maintaining ethical standards, therefore, should discourage 
relativism. Firms that are struggling to raise standards (e.g., those that are working under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) may find it valuable to screen for high relativism by 
including a few relativism items on pre-employment tests. This may present legal 
difficulties in some cases, but they may be surmountable in cases where performance has 
been affected. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide reduced penalties for 
organizations that demonstrate significant incorporation of ethics in their culture 
(LeClair, Ferrell and Fraedrich 1998). Such cost savings may provide a rationale to 
screen out potential employees that are highly relativistic.
The most critical managerial implications of this research derive from several 
findings. Employees of more ethical corporations are more likely to perceive the 
problematic ethical content in a situation, and those who perceive the problems tend to 
make more ethical judgments. Marketers who rely on a deontologicai evaluation are more 
likely to form ethical judgments, and they rely more on deontologicai than on teleological 
evaluations. Finally, drawing this all together, those who form ethical judgments are 
more likely to have more ethical intentions. In other words, a corporation that works to 
create an ethical culture, and to communicate that ‘"we do the right thing here” can expect 
that employees will have more ethical intentions.
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This recommendation may appear hollow; after all, what corporation that wants 
ethical results would not reinforce deontologicai norms? In practice, however, managers 
seem a bit confused about what works. This researcher has, for the past two years, served 
as a mentor at the National Conference on Ethics in America, hosted by the United States 
Military Academy at West Point. The experience has yielded several conversations with 
corporate ethics officers (e.g., Lockheed Martin, B. F. Goodrich). When asked about how 
they balanced deontologicai with teleological considerations in ethics training, the typical 
response was that they used both. “Some people won’t be convinced to do the right thing 
unless you threaten them with consequences,” one responded. This seems an adequate 
response, at first glance, but one needs to consider that it is much easier to talk about 
consequences than to create an ethical culture.
In order to create a culture where each employee has a sense of “what we do and 
don’t do here,” ethics training must focus primarily on enunciating the firm’s 
deontologicai norms. CEO speeches should continuously emphasize these norms, 
including specific references to “doing the right thing” for its own sake—-just because 
“that’s how we do it here.” Managers at every level should recognize employees who 
make hard, but right, ethical choices, irrespective of consequences, setting them up as 
high-visibility role models.4 These managerial behaviors would go a long way toward 
creating and maintaining a corporate culture whose employees will not hesitate to look 
themselves in the mirror every morning.
4 LeClair, Ferrell and Fraedrich (1998, p. 70) refer to the Federal Sentencing  G uidelines as a  “carro t and 
stick” approach. The stick is the th reat o f  sanctions; the carrot is avo id ing  penalties. W hat is proposed here 
are better “carrots” , that o f  m anagem ent recognition and rew ard. B eyond that, and o f  g rea ter value to 
certain em ployees, is the satisfaction o f  w orking for a  com pany tha t is know n to  maintain high and 
uncom prom ising standards o f  eth ical conduct.
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Appendix: Research Instrument
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
O cpirtraeni o f M anagem ent and M arketing 
College of B u iin eu  an d  P ub lic  A dm m m  ration 
G raduate  School of Buiineas an d  P u b lic  Adminiatration 
.Norfolk. V irginia 23329-0220 
P h o n e : (737) 683-3337
November 5,1998
Dear Fellow AMA Member
The enclosed questionnaire is part o f a national study on marketing ethics, which is part of 
the dissertation requirement to earn a Ph.D. The purpose of the project is to explore ways in 
which marketers make ethical decisions, and some of the background factors that may 
explain why two people might make very different decisions in the same situation. We would 
like very much to have the opinions o f people who actually confront these problems—  
practitioner members of the American Marketing Association.
Please record your first response to questions, rather than pondering them at length. When we 
describe a marketing situation, try to picture yourself in the situation and imagine how you 
would react. There are no right or wrong answers to any o f the questions, so please respond 
candidly. It should take you about 10-15 minima to complete the questionnaire.
Because we can contact only a small percentage o f marketers, your response is very 
important. Your anonymity is strictly guaranteed; neither identifying information nor return 
address is required. Please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope we have 
included. The diskette labels are yours to keep, as a small gesture of our gratitude for your 
help with our project.
We greatly appreciate your participation.
ianet K. Mullin Marta Anusom Stnghapakdi
Cordially,
Doctoral Candidate Associate Professor o f Marketing 
Dissertation Director
014 rhrin ifM  UmTcrwfy It i n  e tpui up port unity. iCDmadvr action imcitation.
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The first section o f  the questionnaire looks at three aspects o f  ethical decision-making:
(1) the ethics o f the organization in which you work, (2) how you perceive ethics codes 
generally, and (3) your religious values. Please read each statement carefully, then indicate 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with it by circling a number to the right o f the 
statement.
1. Managers in my company often engage in 
behaviors that I consider to be unethical.
2. in order to succeed in my company, it is often 
necessary to compromise one’s ethics.
3 . Top management in my company has let it be 
known in no uncertain terms that unethical 
behaviors will not be tolerated.
4. if a manager in my company is discovered to 
have engaged in unethical behavior that results 
primarily in personal gain (rather than corporate 
gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded.
5. If a manager in my company is discovered to 
have engaged in unethical behavior that results 
primarily in corporate gain (rather than personal 
gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded.
6. Questions of what is ethical for everyone cannot 
be resolved, because what is (im)moral is up to 
the individual.
7. Different moral or ethical codes cannot be 
compared as to “rightness.”
8. Moral standards are simply personal rules that 
indicate how a person should behave—end are 
not to be used to make judgments of others.
9. Because what I believe is morally right or wrong 
may differ from other people, my moral code 
cannot be meaningfully compared to anyone 
elsc’s.
Strongly Strongly
disigret i g r a
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10. I should refrain from judging other people's 
actions because my morel code applies only to 
me.
11. Spirituality is a key to living a happy life.
12. I feel responsible, because of religious values, 
to help people who are less fortunate than I am.
13. I feel it is important to worship regularly.
14. Religious faith makes life an exciting and 
challenging journey.
15. My religious beliefs help me to accept other 
people as they are.
16. My religion gives focus and direction to my 
life.
17. It is vital to support religious organizations 
financially.
18. My religious faith convinces me that it is better 





Next, we would tike to have your opinions on different ethical situations. Please read and consider 
each of the following three scenarios and answer the questions that follow them.
Situation 1—A research analyst is working hard to complete a statistical analysis for presentation to 
the advertising agency that represents a new, and potentially valuable, account Because of various 
data collection problems and budget constraints, the analyst doesn't have much faith that the figures 
are representative of the product’s target audience. He believes his boss expects the figures to be 
consistent with the company's initial recommendations to the company.
Action: The analyst makes adjustments that he believes are consistent with the data be has collected, 
bringing them into line with the original recommendations.
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
19. The action described above involves an ethical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
problem.
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20. Please rate the analyst’s action as to how ethical I 2 3 4 5 6 7
you believe it was.
If you answered question #20 with any number greater than 1, you believe the analyst did not make 
the most ethical decision. Now, please describe how you would go about assessing the ethics of the 
situation, by following these steps:
(1) Read the following six reasons and decide on one that you feel is most important in your thinking 
about the analyst’s action. Write “100" to the right of that reason.
(2) Next, compare the remaining reasons to the mast important one and write in values of less than 
100, to represent how important each reason is to you. For example, the second reason might seem 
very close to the first, so you might write 95 or 99 next to it. Other reasons may seem quite 
unimportant, so you might give them 10 or 20. Remember, doa’t add the numbers, just assign any 
numbers, 1-100. to represent the weight of the reasons in your personal judgment
21. The analyst’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the company a lot of
money. ______
22. The analyst’s action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of his research. ______
23. The analyst’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent ______
24. The analyst’s action is wrong because his supervisor might be blamed for his 
dishonest behavior.
25. The analyst’s action is wrong because his company could lose the account because 
of his unethical behavior.
26. The analyst’s action is unethical because it involves lying.
Very Very
likely unlikely
2 7 .1 would behava as the analyst did in the same I 2 3 4 S 6 7
situation.
Sltaatioc 2—A person bought a new car from a franchised automobile dealership in the local area. 
Eight months after the car was purchased, he began having problems with the transmission. He took 
the car back to the dealer, and some minor adjustments were made. During the next few months, he 
continually had a similar problem with the transmission slipping. Each time, the dealer only
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minor adjustments on the car. Again, during the 13th month after buying the car, the man returned to 
the deaJer because the transmission still was not functioning properly. At this rime, the transmission 
was completely overhauled.
Action: Because the warranty was for only one year (12 months from the date of purchase), the 
dealer charged the full price for parts and labor.










29. Please rate the dealer’s action as to how ethical I 
you believe it was.
As you did in the first situation, if you answered the last question with any number greater than 1, 
please rate the following reasons in terms of how important each is to you in your thinking about the 
ethics of the situation, starting with “100" by the most important reason and comparing the others.
30. The dealer's action is wrong because it could end up costing the company a lot of
money, ifthe car owner chooses to sue or even report the case to the local news ______
media.
31. The dealer’s action is wrong because it is manipulative. ______
32. The dealer’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent__________________________ ______
33. The dealer’s action is unethical because it reflects negatively, not only on his own 
dealership, but also on the manufacturer. ______
34. The dealer’s action is wrong hecause he has probably lost a customer, and maybe
others, through negative word-of-mouth. ______
35. The dealer’s action is unethical because it involves lying. ______
Very Very
likety unlikely
36 .1 would behave as the dealer did in the same 
situation.
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Situation 3—A young woman, recently hired u  a salesperson for a local retail store, has been 
working very hard to impress her boss with her selling ability. At times, this young woman, anxious 
for an order, has been a little overeager. To get the order, she exaggerates the value of the item or 
withholds relevant information concerning the product she is trying to sell. No fraud or deceit is 
intended by her actions; she is simply overeager.








38. Please rate the owner's action as to how ethical 1 2 3 4 S 6 7
you believe it was.
Again, if you answered with a number greater than 1, please rate the following reasons in terms of
how important each is to you in your thinking about the ethics of the situation.
39. The owner’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the company a lot of _____
money, through negative word-of-mouth.
40. The owner's action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of the business. ______
41. The owner’s action is wrong because it condones fraud. ______
42. The owner’s action is wrong because the whole company might develop a ______
reputation for deceiving customers.
43. The owner’s action is wrong because his company might end up losing business _____
because of the salesperson's exaggerations.
44. The owner’s action is unethical because it allows multiple lies to customers. ______
Very Very
likely unlikely
45. I would behave as the owner of the retail store 
did in the same situation.
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Finally, please provide the following information for classification.
46. Sex: 1. Male
4S. Age:_________
2. Female
49. Yean of formal education 
completed:_
(For example: Finished high school" 12,
Finished college “  16)
50. Religion: □  Buddhist (i)
□  Christian (Catholic or Protestant) (l)
□  Confucian (3)
□  Hindu (4)
□  Jew (j)
□  Muslim 0)
□  Other (7) (please clarify)
47. Please indicate your primary job function.
□  Direct Marketing (i)
□  Marketing Communications m
□  Packaging/Point of Purchase (3)
□  Sales/Sales Management m
□  Advertising (S)
□  Distribution/Pricing (S)
□  Merchandising/Retailing (7)
□  Telemarketing d)
Q  Database Marketing (9)
□  Market Research (io>
□  Promotions (i i)
□  None (D
51. Nature of undergraduate education: □  Business (!)
□  Liberal aits (3)
□  Sciences (3) 
QOther (4>(pl< specify)
52. Income: □  Less than 519,999 (i)
□  520,000-549,999 ff)
□  550,000-574,999 (3)
□  575,000-599,999 (4)
□  5100,000 or more (5)
A cordial “thank you* for your haipfulrmsa and for your tana.
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IMAGE EVALUATION
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